

BUCHANAN: CONTAIN IRAN ■ DE BORCHGRAVE: ARE WE SAFER?

JULY 14, 2003

The American Conservative

DECLINE OF THE DOLLAR



www.amconmag.com

\$3.00 US / \$4.00 CANADA

28>



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

By Robertson Morrow

Is a New Bill Clinton Waiting in the Wings?

One thing is certain. The Democrats are desperate for the presidency. They're looking back at the decline and fall of the first George Bush. And they believe it could happen again.

That's why you'll need *Insight* in this critical year!

We promise this time there won't be any surprises. You can count on *Insight* magazine to deliver the facts the rest of the media will ignore in the coming months.

In fact, we've already started. And we'll make you the first to know about every skeleton in every closet!

Along with every detail of the War on Terror overlooked by others.

Insight will keep you informed every step of the way. Without spin, distortion – or averting our eyes. *Insight* will stand up for you. And if we stand on some powerful toes in the process – So be it.



So if you need to know what's really going on in Washington. If you appreciate knowing things before anybody else. And if you're concerned about where this country may be heading in the next presidential election. You need *Insight*!

Accept our special risk-free offer. Simply fill out the Subscription Discount Voucher and mail it in. And if you're ever dissatisfied with us – for any reason – just cancel your subscription. And you'll get a full refund for your unmailed copies. **There's just no risk!**

**With So Much On the Line...
You Need *Insight*!**

Insight

ON THE NEWS



Insight Discount Subscription Voucher



YES! Send me a year of *Insight* (26 issues). I appreciate knowing the inside-Washington stories before anybody else. And I want to save \$72 off the cover price! If I ever change my mind, I'll get a full refund on all my unmailed issues. No questions asked.

(Please Print)

Name _____ Address _____
City _____ State _____ Zip _____

☐ Check enclosed for \$29.⁹⁵ (payable to: *Insight*)

SAVE \$72!
off the cover price

☐ VISA ☐ MasterCard ☐ AmEx ☐ Discover

Acct. # _____ Exp. _____

Signature _____ ☐ Bill me

Mail To: *Insight* Subscription Dept.,
P.O. Box 96067,
Washington, DC 20077-7310

Or Call Us Toll-Free: 1-800-356-3588
Or Visit: www.insightmag.com

Contents

July 14, 2003 / Vol. 2, No. 14



[COVER]

Decline of the Dollar

BY ROBERTSON MORROW The combined forces of globalization and over-consumption threaten America's strong-dollar tradition. Page 8

[IDEAS]

Who is Playing Leviathan Now?

BY PAUL GOTTFRIED Thomas Hobbes would find his dreaded state of nature in the streets of Baghdad. Page 14

[CULTURE]

This Land is Your Land

BY MARK ROYDEN WINCHELL The Southern Agrarians' recognition of the tension between liberty and modernity contributed much to American conservatism. Page 17

[WORLD]

Are We Safer?

BY ARNAUD DE BORCHGRAVE Why Bush's terror chief resigned before the war. Page 20

COLUMNS

7 Patrick J. Buchanan: Contain Iran; don't attack it.

30 Taki: Off to Pamplona to run the bulls *à la* Papa Hemingway

NEWS & VIEWS

4 Fourteen Days: America the Occupier; Diversity Up, Constitution Down; Wesley Clark's Confession

ARTICLES

12 Sam Torode: In Praise of Free Love

16 William von Raab: Most Favored Nation (Spying) Status

21 Robin Birley: Take Sudan off the terror list

ARTS & LETTERS

23 Steve Sailer: Mozart vs. Mao

24 R.J. Stove: Stalin's Last Crime

26 H.A. Scott Trask IV: Getting the American Revolution wrong

28 Jeremy Lott: Philip Jenkins takes terrorism apart.

COVER ILLUSTRATION: BILL COOK


[POSTWAR]

OCCUPIED TERRITORY

The strongest emotion one feels for the American soldiers on Iraqi occupation duty is not pride, though they do much to win our admiration. It is empathy and the kind of sorrow that comes from contemplating the impossible task before them. One day, a report of a 12-year-old Iraqi girl armed with an AK-47. Another day, a mine takes out a Humvee, a third day a sniper attacks. It is beginning to seep into the American consciousness that the postwar occupation is going poorly.

The images are heartbreaking. American troops—young, always well trained, trying hard to be sensitive to the Iraqis, all too aware of the need to, in that 1968 Mekong Delta phrase, “win hearts and minds”—are daily confronted with the wretched business of occupation. They are opposed by the Iraqis who simply wonder why liberation has left them without water, electricity, and basic security. They are opposed by Sunni Muslims who feel their own place in Iraq has been upended, by Shi’ites bidding their time before pushing hard for a theocratic Islamist state, by Saddam’s loyalists, and now by a trickle of fighters sneaking in from other Arab countries.

In the months prior to the invasion, the warrior pundits made snappy comments about a “war for Iraqi liberation.” The unstaged photographs—American soldiers with fixed bayonets, staring down crowds of angry Iraqis—make that claim as empty as the contention that this was a war about Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction. Of course it would be nice if Iraq—in contravention of every known law of history and sociology—could be transformed by outside invasion into something like Switzerland. When American tanks rolled into Baghdad without serious resistance, the War Party was jubilant. When, they asked, would antiwar folks



like us admit error? For the most part, the keyboard Clausewitzes are quieter now, increasingly uncertain that they have anything useful to say about the mess in Iraq, though some want to cover their tracks by starting yet another war, against Iran.

Two months have passed since the administration achieved its two triumphant photo-ops—a statue of Saddam dragged down in front of a tiny but enthusiastic crowd and a president in a flight suit landing on an aircraft carrier. Americans are just beginning to realize there is a bill for these images, and we will be paying for some time. If there is justice, those who planned and plotted and agitated for this war, who decided how it should be sold to the American people—

those who have done so much to damage America’s good name in the world—will one day be held accountable.

[DIVERSITY]

JUSTICE IS NOT (COLOR) BLIND

The Supreme Court upheld the University of Michigan’s law school admissions procedure (*Grutter v. Bollinger*) while striking down its undergraduate procedure (*Gratz v. Bollinger*), endorsing race preferences more strongly than in its *Bakke* decision. *Gratz* is a red herring: but for the too-obvious 20 point bonus for being black, Hispanic, or American Indian, that scheme would have met the lax standard conjured by Justice O’Connor in *Grutter*. *Bakke* had decreed that student-body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in admissions. *Bakke* at least noted that strict scrutiny, the highest standard of judicial review, applies to any state use of race.

In *Gratz*, O’Connor drops strict scrutiny: “The Law School’s educational decision that [racial] diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer.” Ignoring the harm to qualified applicants denied and the stigma that follows preferred minorities admitted, the Court grants all American universities *carte blanche*—as Justice Thomas observes in dissent—to “continu[e] their social experiments on other people’s children.” O’Connor suggests we revisit the issue in 25 years, when we won’t need discrimination to create the multi-hued classes our elites prefer.

Thomas’s and Scalia’s dissents state better law: the Equal Protection Clause forbids state racial preferences. Scalia’s verdict: “Today’s *Grutter-Gratz* split double header seems perversely designed to prolong the controversy and the litigation.”

President Bush disagrees: “I applaud the Supreme Court for recognizing the

value of diversity on our Nation's campuses. Diversity is one of America's greatest strengths." Conservatives looking to him for justices who respect the Constitution may be disappointed.

—Howard Sutherland

[NEOCONS]

TALKING POINTS

In a recent appearance on "Meet the Press," Gen. Wesley Clark recalled, "On 9/11 ... I was on CNN, and I got a call at my home saying, 'You got to say this is connected. This is state-sponsored terrorism. This has to be connected to Saddam Hussein.' I said, 'But—I'm willing to say it but what's your evidence?' And I never got any evidence. And these were people who had—Middle East think tanks and people like this and it was a lot of pressure to connect this and there were a lot of assumptions made." The mystery think tank? No shortage of suspects.

[IMMIGRATION]

WHERE HAVE YOU GONE, PETER BRIMELOW?

We hear that Victor Davis Hanson, farmer, classicist, neoconservative pundit, and advocate of getting America involved in many, many wars has written a tough book about Mexico's colonization of California through immigration. We have assigned the book to a reviewer and await his appraisal. But in the meantime, Hanson's book hints at another question, which is whether those who favor enforcement of American laws against illegal immigration and a slowdown in the overall immigration rate can remain in the good graces of the neocon establishment. On one hand are the cases of several individuals, who considered themselves sincere friends and allies of the neocons during the 1990s, who were tarred as bigots and xenophobes and in some cases tossed out of their jobs because the neocons took issue with their immigration views.

On the other hand is Hanson whose circumstance seems to argue that if the preponderance of your advocacy journalism is geared to advocating American wars against Muslim governments and peoples, the neocons will overlook unpalatable views on immigration. But how energetic do you have to be in your war mongering? For the occupation of how many countries must you agitate? VDH has set the bar very high.

[ECONOMY]

THE BOMBAY COMPANY

The *New York Times* recently featured a story about Tennessee food-stamp recipients who, unbeknownst to them, are having their phone inquiries answered by operators in Bombay. India's low-wage pool of polite English speakers is proving irresistible to companies seeking to fit into shrunken budgets, and if the trend continues apace, 3.3 million American jobs will migrate overseas by 2015.

Last week, India's Commerce Minister Arun Jaitley visited the U.S. to ensure that this exodus not only continues but reaches beyond service jobs to the information technology sector. New Jersey, Maryland, Connecticut, and Washington are considering proposals to keep government computer contracts at home, but U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick has taken the Indians' side, denouncing the measures as "bad policy" and promising to pressure the state legislatures. For his part, Jaitley threatens that if the matter is not resolved to India's satisfaction, he will appeal to the World Trade Organization.

Such is the high cost of free trade. If borders are irrelevant and the world if but one market, jobs will naturally flow to the cheapest point—leaving unemployed Americans to wonder how they were so easily sold on the free traders' happy talk of rising tides and global prosperity. ■

The American Conservative

Editors

Patrick J. Buchanan
Taki Theodoracopulos

Executive Editor

Scott McConnell

Managing Editor

Kara Hopkins

Assistant Editor

Matthew Alexander

Art Director

Mark Graef

Office Manager

Veronica Yanos

Publishing Consultant

Ronald E. Burr

Newsstand Consultant

Rande Davis

The American Conservative, Vol. 2, No. 14, July 14, 2003 (ISSN 1540-966X). *AC* is published 24 times per year, biweekly (except for double issues in January and August) for \$49.97 per year by The American Conservative, LLC, 1300 Wilson Blvd, Suite 120, Arlington VA, 22209. (703) 875-7600. Periodicals postage pending at Arlington, VA, and additional mailing offices. Printed in the United States of America. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to *The American Conservative*, P.O. Box 99010, Collingswood, NJ 08108-0612.

Subscription rates: \$49.97 per year (24 issues) in the U.S., \$54.97 in Canada (U.S. funds), and \$69.97 other foreign (U.S. funds). Back issues: \$6.00 (prepaid) per copy in USA, \$7.00 in Canada (U.S. funds). For subscription orders, payments, and other subscription inquiries—by mail: *The American Conservative*, P.O. Box 99010, Collingswood, NJ 08108-0612. By phone: 800-579-6148 (outside the U.S./Canada call 856-488-5321). Via the web: www.amconmag.com. When ordering a subscription please allow 4-6 weeks for delivery of your first issue and all subscription transactions. This issue went to press on June 26, 2003. Copyright 2003 *The American Conservative*. Inquiries to the editor should be sent to letters@amconmag.com.

VIVE L'AMÉRIQUE

I have just read "Colin Powell, Conservative?" (May 19), and it is a great relief to listen to such reasonable views. We Europeans have suffered much to gain this knowledge: no one should consider war as a normal policy tool but only as the very last way to preserve one's country's freedom.

I hope that you understand that the French position was not an expression of treason or of cowardice. We were at your side in the first Gulf War, in the Afghan campaign, and in the fight against al-Qaeda. In all these cases, international law and collective security had been breached, which fully justified retaliation and the use of force.

In the case of Iraq, we were far from such legitimacy, not to mention the lack of WMD evidence. We believed that this war would not improve security, but, on the contrary, would worsen the situation for U.S. and Western interests. We also disagreed with the foolhardy concept of pre-emptive war.

The imperial arrogance we are enduring now does not look like the America we used to know. For the safety of our nations, we Europeans hope that we will find again the great Nation of Freedom that seems to have forgotten its legacy.

PHILIPPE DENIS

Paris, France

TO EACH HIS OWN

In his June 16 article, J.P. Zmirak said that workers should be forced to support their elderly parents. Using this logic, they should also be forced to provide for their own old age.

I am a living example of what happens when you don't do that. I was never rich but made enough money to have saved. I never did and am now living on Social Security (welfare since it is more than two years). But if, by law, I had been required to have an IRA—and do without a few restaurant meals, off-

Broadway plays, and symphony concerts—I and the entire country would be better off.

It must be added that while his instincts are sound, Zmirak's solution is essentially neocon. He does not propose smaller government; he merely wants government to promote conservative values.

JEFFERSON CHASE

Fairfield, Conn.

MOTHERLAND'S MISSION

With reference to Robert Locke's article (June 2), there is no such thing as "defensible colonialism" by Britain, and this is another myth often concocted by the apologists of the Empire. We have not had true free market capitalism in our history. It has always been state and mercantile capitalism, protected by the sword of the state.

In the case of the British Empire and the Industrial Revolution, capital did not come out of thin air. A significant amount was provided by India, the "pivot of the empire" to use Lord Curzon's words. In turn, the "pivot of the empire" was provided with finished goods from the motherland. The motherland made sure it protected its merchants by destroying existing industries in the colony and making sure there was no competition by entrepreneurs for the emerging industries of the revolution.

KUPPUSAMY RAVINDRAN

Via e-mail

MUGG'S KILLING FIELDS?

R.J. Stove's presentation of Muggeridge is generally well done (June 16). And there can be no quarrel that Muggeridge's theology was suspect. But there is one false leap in the piece, when his blanket condemnation of modern thought, literature, and art is declared to be mere anti-intellectualism and equated with Pol Pot's murderous regime! Muggeridge's deploring of the nearly ter-

minal decadence of modern culture is entirely legitimate and is underpinned by nostalgia for the great traditions of the past. But Pol Pot and his fellow communists were utopian revolutionaries who wished to destroy the entire heritage of the past, so as to clear the ground for a workers' paradise. Does Stove actually think these two things are the same?

JONATHAN CHAVES

Washington, D.C.

R.J. Stove responds:

Of course I don't think the two things are the same. (If for some reason I did, I wouldn't have praised Muggeridge's exposés of Soviet famine. Nor, I imagine, would AC wish to print my work.) The point I endeavored to make was this: a large and excessively influential element of the Right confuses justified hatred of intellectual corruption with hatred of the intellect itself. There is nothing virtuous about such hatred: Pol Pot's anti-intellectual genocide, like Mao's, should have taught us all that. Unfortunately it hasn't. And I suggested that among those whom it did not teach was Muggeridge. Naturally no one should suppose that Muggeridge aimed for one moment to furnish the Khmer Rouge with know-nothing doctrine. But world-famous publicity-hounds, of all people, have every reason to remember, first, that the law of unintended consequences really does exist; second, that "nostalgia for the great traditions of the past" comes best from those with more detailed knowledge of those traditions than Muggeridge's grasshopper mind ever bothered to acquire.

The American Conservative welcomes letters to the editor. Submit by e-mail to letters@amconmag.com, by fax to 703-875-3350, or by mail to 1300 Wilson Blvd., Suite 120, Arlington, VA 22209. Please include your name, address, and phone number. We reserve the right to edit all correspondence for space and clarity.

Iran: The Case for Containment

With the 150,000 U.S. troops in Iraq now the daily target of guerrilla attack—and no exit strategy in sight—the War Party has begun to caw for a policy of “regime change” in Tehran.

But the president has seemed hesitant and understandably so. For clearly the Pentagon did not prepare him for the criminality, chaos, and resistance we would encounter after the fall of Baghdad or for the possibility that Saddam's weapons might not be found.

Bush's problem, however, is there is hard evidence Tehran is conducting a crash program to build nuclear weapons. While U.S. eyes had previously been focused on the Russian-built nuclear plant at Bushehr, a second plant has been discovered. Now, a third has been placed off limits by Tehran to international inspectors.

As Iran is awash in oil, what purpose are they for? If it is to produce electric power, why have the mullahs been so secretive about them? Why have they not invited in UN inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency to demonstrate their benign character? The answer suggests itself.

Bush has now declared that the world “cannot tolerate” atomic weapons in Iran. But only America has the power and will to enforce such a policy if Iran is determined to possess such weapons. And what are our options?

The war option—invasion and disarmament of Iran—appears off the table. We do not have the ground forces. The UN Security Council has passed no resolution directing Iran to open up its nuclear sites for inspection. The president does not have the authority from

Congress to wage war on Iran. And the American people are unprepared for a third war in three years.

As for a pre-emptive strike on Iran's nuclear facilities, that would be seen by Iranians as an act of criminal aggression against their country. It would very likely unite the people and regime in furious resolve to pay America back with acts of terror and with aid to the Iraqi *intifada*, the Afghan resistance, and al-Qaeda. This could lead to all-out war, a war in which America would have no allies.

As for the president's support for the Iranian students who have been marching against the regime, that seems only to have left those students exposed to the charge of being American dupes.

Another option is to continue working with the Europeans and the Security Council to pressure Iran to open up to IAEA inspection. Eventually, through a threat of economic sanctions, we might force Tehran to put its nuclear facilities under international watch. But if the ayatollahs have made a decision to acquire the same weapons Pakistan and Israel have, then even sanctions may not work. And if Iran presses on with its nuclear program, which may be only two or three years from completion, what do we do?

Bush could face the situation Truman faced when he learned that Stalin, thanks to U.S. traitors and spies, had exploded an atomic bomb four years before we estimated he could build one.

It is the situation Lyndon Johnson faced when Mao's China exploded its first atomic bomb in 1964.

In both crises, America adopted a policy of containing Stalin and Mao with air, land, and sea power and of deterring them from threatening us with nuclear weapons by building a mighty missile and bomber force of our own.

Containment and deterrence. The policy derided by President Bush as inadequate for an age of rogue states and nuclear weapons remains America's reliable fallback position in dealing with Iran.

Nor is it a policy to be disrespected. Since the fall of the Shah in 1979, America has been isolated from Iran. Result: a generation has grown up that knows nothing of the Shah and sees as its enemy not faraway America, but the mullahs at home who have misruled and repressed them all their lives. Twice, Iranians have voted by 70 percent to throw the mullahs out. Twice, they have been disillusioned by the weakling reformers they have elected.

But, lately, anti-government demonstrators have been back in the streets. The mullahs are steadily losing favor, as a prelude to losing power. Thus, before President Bush heeds the counsel of a War Party that has us bogged down in Iraq, he should reconsider the merits of the policy that won the Cold War: deterrence and containment.

For in power, Islamic fundamentalism has proven itself as great a failure as Bolshevism and Maoism. Time is on our side.

What America needs in its clash with rogue regimes like North Korea and Iran is not pre-emptive wars, but what Mark Twain called the “calm confidence of a Christian with four aces.” ■

[yen for euros]

Decline of the Dollar

Globalization and over-consumption combine to topple America's strong-dollar tradition.

By Robertson Morrow

A Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy, a classic of science fiction and black comedy, follows the adventures of its earth-born hero as he hitchhikes through space. As the story goes, a government announces that its planet is doomed, and therefore it will move the population to a new planet on three ships. The smallest, the "A" ship, holds the best and brightest the doomed planet has to offer: scientific researchers and key executives. The sizable "C" ship contains those who do the actual work, such as manufacturing. The "B" ship carries those in the middle: "Millions of them. Hairdressers, tired TV producers, insurance salesmen, personnel officers, security guards, public relations executives, management consultants, you name it."

The "B" ship's passengers are told by the "A" ship leaders that because they are really important people on the doomed planet, they must go first to find the refuge. In truth, the planet is not doomed, and the "A" and "C" ships are never built. "A" ship types concocted the story to rid their planet of the useless ballast that is the "B" ship.

To understand where the American

economy is headed as the dollar drops in value, it is best to think of American workers as populating the three ships:

- On the "A" ship are those talented enough to add value regardless of the strength of the dollar—perhaps 1 percent of our working population.
- On the "C" ship are those in hard industries that have survived a decade of the strong dollar—about 20 percent of our workers.
- On the "B" ship is everyone else.

For the past 10 years, the United States government has worked to keep the dollar strong, following a policy set out by Clinton Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, former CEO of Goldman Sachs. Under the "strong dollar policy," "B" ship America luxuriated in cheap imports, an increasingly large fraction of which—roughly one-fifth—was bought on credit.

But foreigners have had their fill of lending us dollars. Since March 2001, the dollar has fallen in value compared to most major currencies, and it promises to drop much further. That means "B" ship America will soon be paying higher prices for the goods it buys, while borrowing fewer dollars.

"C" ship America—the goods-producing sector—is in revolt over the strong-dollar policy, as it directly reduces the prices "C" ship America receives for its goods. Indirectly, the strong-dollar policy is based on cleaving American markets wide open for foreign goods without any protection or strategy to develop "C" ship industries.

Treasury Secretary John Snow, previously CEO of the railroad CSX, represents interests that want a weaker dollar, such as the steel and machine-tool makers in Midwestern states critical to Bush's re-election and the farmers who dominate the rural fifth of America, the Republican heartland.

On May 18, Secretary Snow made headlines with his announcement that the U.S. government would no longer defend the value of the dollar. International traders sitting at their Bloomberg terminals took a collective gasp upon reading his brutal dismissal of the American tradition of maintaining a strong currency. The dollar lunged to multi-year lows.

To prevent an immediate rout, President Bush was trotted out a few days later to restate support for the traditional



BILL COOK

strong dollar. Yet Snow's comments confirmed the obvious. As Warren Buffet explained, "What's happening with the dollar is not a product of the administration's policy." Instead, the cause is excessive consumption: "We are a country that is buying more from the rest of the world than we are selling and we're doing it on a big scale. Any other country in the world that did it on that scale would have had a much greater currency depreciation already."

There are two ways for a nation to have a strong currency: export goods or export debt. Naturally, both kinds of exports require willing foreign buyers. Few countries have strong currencies.

For the past six years, America's great export has been not goods but debt. Foreigners sell us oil, cars, computer components, and other goods. In return, we sell them debt and other financial instruments—government bonds, corporate bonds, and securities backed by the

mortgages of American homeowners—for which foreigners have seemed to have an almost insatiable appetite. From 1997 to 2002, imports of goods and services increased by a third, while exports of goods and services were flat.

The measure economists use to quantify this export of debt is the "current account"—the broadest measure of foreign trade. The current account is the difference between what we earn overseas (primarily sales of goods, sales of services, and earnings on our overseas investments) minus what foreigners earn here (primarily imports of goods, imports of services, and foreigners' earnings on their investments in the U.S.). If the current account is negative, we cover the deficit with debt.

Prior to 1983, America's current account deficit never exceeded 1 percent of GDP. (In fact, it was usually in surplus.) Now, the current account is in massive deficit, and that deficit is rising.

We buy more overseas than we sell. In 2003, the current account deficit will be more than half a trillion dollars—over 5 percent of GDP.

Foreigners have been willing to lend massive amounts of money to Americans because of a relatively strong dollar, high financial returns in the U.S., and an almost touching faith in the strength of America. Moreover, foreign governments such as those in Japan and China have also been willing to hold our debt in order to make the dollar stronger so they can build their home industries with exports to America.

Because interest on debt compounds, rising foreign demand for additional U.S. debt cannot go on forever. In fifty years time, each year's current account deficit will be greater than GDP. At some point, long before then, something must give. That something is the dollar.

The trade crisis of the late 1980s was the only other time America's current

account deficit greatly exceeded 1 percent of GDP. In the six worst years of the '80s trade crisis, 1984 to 1989, the cumulative current account deficits totaled 16 percent of GDP. At that time, the dollar declined by half.

Yet the current account crisis in 2003 is much worse than it was in 1989, and for the simplest of reasons: while the cri-

until the trade deficit in goods and services declines from today's levels of about 4 percent of GDP to under 1 percent of GDP.

How far must the dollar fall to cut the trade deficit by three quarters? Jim O'Neill of Goldman Sachs estimates that to reduce the trade deficit by half through higher exports, a 43 percent decline in

production of higher-quality goods in China and growing worldwide production.

- A decline in the dollar may eliminate the import of most assembled cars into the U.S. from everywhere but Canada and Mexico, but foreign cars built here require key components from countries like Japan.
- Only a severe dollar decline will bring into balance our trade deficit in computers and electronics because of critical Japanese monopolies and low Chinese labor costs.

A DOLLAR DECLINE WILL END THE CONSUMPTION BUBBLE. TO MOST AMERICANS, THIS SHIFT FROM STRENGTH TO WEAKNESS WILL APPEAR SO SUDDEN AND PAINFUL AS TO SEEM THE DEATH OF THE DOLLAR.

sis of the 1980s ended by 1989, today's has just begun. In the six years from 1998 to 2003, the cumulative current account deficit will total 23 percent of GDP—almost half again as large as the six worst years of the 1980s. The trade deficit in 2003 will come in at least twice as large as that of the 1989 deficit. The 2004 deficit may be larger still.

How low is the dollar likely to go?

As foreign demand for U.S. debt abates, the strength of the dollar will no longer be determined by money flows. It will be determined by trade flows. That means the dollar will decline until those flows come into something approaching historical balance: a current account deficit of about 1 percent of GDP or less.

Returning to historical balance is going to be difficult because of changes in the American overseas investment position. In the 1980s trade crisis, we could count on the enormous investment cushion earned from a century of past trade surpluses. But we have spent all the money our forebears earned, and more, in the past 20 years. Therefore, the current account deficit is going to be larger than the trade deficit in goods and services, and getting back into balance will be all that much harder. Conservatively, this implies the dollar will fall

the dollar will be required. But even this may not be enough.

The U.S. trade position is worse than during the 1980s to such an extent that steep dollar declines will not necessarily improve the trade deficit. After a big currency decline, a country's trade deficit will initially worsen because higher prices on foreign imports will more than offset the reduced volume of imports (and increased exports) in the short run.

Structurally, about 80 percent of the current account deficit is caused by deficits within five economic sectors:

- In crude oil, we have an \$80 billion deficit and no ability to increase production. Even if prices double, consumption is unlikely to decline sufficiently to prevent the crude-oil deficit from rising.
- Apparel and related goods constitute a highly labor-intensive sector in which no conceivable dollar decline will make America competitive with Bangladesh and El Salvador. The \$100 billion-plus deficits in apparel are unlikely to be materially reduced.
- It will take a steep devaluation of the dollar to reduce the deficits in household goods because of the increased

And forget all the talk about services saving the dollar. We still run a trade surplus in services, but just barely. For example, our entire services surplus is about half our deficit in apparel. And it gets worse. At today's dollar levels, many U.S. service companies cannot compete with emerging foreign-produced services. Without a severe decline in the dollar, the present surplus in services will soon turn to deficit.

So how low does the dollar have to go to make U.S. furniture manufacturers competitive with China in the American market? How much does the dollar have to fall for U.S. software companies to be competitive with those in India? The answer is more than 43 percent.

What will be the consequences?

First, a dollar decline will end the consumption bubble. We will pay more for foreign goods (about 30 percent of all goods Americans buy are foreign-made). We will no longer be able to pay for about one-third of these with paper IOUs as we do now. We will have to buy fewer or lower-quality goods. To most Americans, this shift from strength to weakness will appear so sudden and painful as to seem the death of the dollar.

Second, a dollar decline will shift wealth and power away from the service sector—the "B" ship. There will be fewer service jobs, and the jobs that survive

will pay less. Many in the "B" ship will be lucky to find work in "C" ship industries—for example, foreign-owned auto plants. This may provoke resentment, especially by the millions of American workers who thought they were flying in the "A" ship but turn out to be crashing in the "B" ship.

In contrast, hard industries—"C" ship America—will directly benefit from the dollar decline because they produce goods. And the elites in "A" ship America may do surprisingly well. Although the cost of many manufactured goods will increase, that will be more than offset by the lower costs of almost all services.

Third, a dollar decline will put an end to mass immigration. In the 1990s,

America was flooded with cheap labor, mainly in the service sector. Imports bought on credit more than provided immigrants' fuel, food, clothes, and cars. Since we were not paying for these imports, we could afford the public costs of mass immigration: roads, schools, health care, and welfare. Nothing more exemplified the "B" ship economy than the pro-immigration mantra that there were "jobs that Americans won't do." This will become a cruel joke as more and more "B" ship Americans struggle to find work to pay their debts.

Fourth, a decline in the dollar means the American Empire is in trouble, for reasons best explained by Morgan Stanley's Andrew Xie:

American policy makers should understand that, if the US dollar collapses, the US would likely cease to be the superpower. At the moment, in my view, Americans can enjoy their living standard and still spare so much for defense because of low labor costs in East Asia. If this were no longer the case, Americans would have to do everything themselves and might not be able to put together the war machine that they possess today.

Fifth, a decline in the dollar could upend American politics. Democrats will be tempted to lurch Left, which could result in looting by trial lawyers and government unions. Within the Republican

ADVERTISEMENT

Houdini, Wall Street and GOLD???

A strange comparison it might be, but Wall Street has used the same techniques of the infamous Harry Houdini. Houdini was a genius at media manipulation and self-promotion. He convinced many people in an audience to think and believe as he chose. He knew the power and knew its danger.

Today Wall Street mirrors Houdini's talent to influence the masses. With the assistance of mainstream media pumping financial news and glory 24/7, no wonder this country is under the illusion that a miraculous economic recovery is in the works. Wall Street knows the power.

Wall Street for over twenty years has influenced their audience into thinking and believing as it chooses: convincing the majority of the population that the stock market was a quick way to get rich. The public bought into this and still denies the fact that the stock market is nothing but a ponzi scheme that resulted in hard-working Americans losing trillions of dollars of their retirement funds.

With rising unemployment, declining manufacturing, record trade deficits, record budget deficits, record bankruptcies, declining dollar, corporate America pension funds going broke, social security going broke, massive amounts of cash being pumped into

the system guaranteeing hyper-inflation, and terrorism everywhere, the stock market will never return to the levels it achieved and will lose another 40-50% of its current value.

America and the world are in a crisis, America is broke, the world is broke, and the consumer is broke. There is no recovery in sight.

Forget deflation, hyper-inflation will not be an illusion. The only way you can break out of Wall Street's embrace is by acquiring financial freedom. To do this you must position gold into your portfolio. Gold is and always will be the best hedge against inflation. The stock market has to be the worst investment when measured against inflation.

Since the beginning, gold has always been a monetary metal. The finest example of the protective purchasing power of gold has to be the \$20 gold piece. In 1900 you could purchase a grocery cart of food with a \$20 Liberty Gold Piece. If you take that same coin today, with spot gold being in the mid \$350, you can purchase the same amount of food. I don't believe a share of Lucent would do the same. **The price you buy gold at today will allow you to maintain your purchasing power in the future.**

As many times as Houdini fooled the public, it took just one miscalculated, unprepared

instance to end his life. Don't miscalculate and be unprepared financially. Take control of your finances. Gold is the oldest, simplest, and most effective approach to wealth preservation.

Protect your wealth by placing 30–40% of precious metals in your portfolio to achieve financial freedom.

Privacy is the ultimate as gold investing has yet to be government regulated.

Profit Potential on the undervalued commodity is unlimited. The stage has been set by the central bankers for the biggest gold rally ever seen.

Don't fall under the illusion of Wall Street that gold is barbaric and impractical to own.

Don't delay Call today

**Keystone Precious Metals
800 891 9220**

Located in the heart of Pennsylvania, Keystone Precious Metals brings to you 9 years experience as part owner of one of the largest gold and silver firms in the country.

Beginning with your first contact to the end of your transaction, Keystone Precious Metals offers something more precious than gold,
Peace of Mind!

Party, what happens is anyone's guess. The only thing that can be safely predicted is a purge of the glib globalism that understands little about economics, nothing about national wealth, and less than nothing about comparative labor productivity.

One conceivable replacement for this false faith, and the one I favor, would be some root-canal Republicanism. Take a severe recession. Cut spending. Balance the budget. Secure the borders. Do your homework. Eat your spinach. Take it like a man. Such a program would set credible and serious, if modest, goals for itself. But it is difficult to rally popular passion for such a platform.

Another course, however improbable, would be the adoption of a model based loosely on Japanese and other East Asian success stories. In this respect, the death of the dollar may serve as the economic complement to 9/11, making the hitherto impossible suddenly unstoppable. In broad strokes, a coercive reconstruction of the American economy along East Asian lines is not particularly difficult to understand. Consumers would not be allowed to overspend—they would say good-bye to construction of new subdivisions, large SUVs, and mailboxes full of credit-card offerings. Workers would be forced to save—the carrot of tax cuts on savings and investment would be reinforced by the stick of mandatory savings plans such as those in Singapore. Business would be required to invest in hard industries—the low-interest money now directed toward consumption would be redirected to sectors such as advanced materials, electronic components, and energy. None of these steps would be popular, but collectively they would short-circuit a dollar-driven collapse in U.S. power.

The post-war success of the New Bureaucrats in Japan suggests that such a model requires independent power

centers willing and able to force such a model upon the country. This scenario is plausible in the U.S. in the near future because we have such power centers: the uniformed military brass, the politically savvy leadership of what remains of advanced manufacturing, and the brilliant, ruthless, young Republican legal minds now flowing into the security establishment. These are among the few remaining sources of competence and effectiveness within the American political system. They may be the only ones.

The general trends are all moving in the direction of transforming Republicans into the security party—not just the party of national security but also the party of economic security. As Mor-

gan Stanley's Andrew Xie emphasized, the death of the dollar requires radical action if America is to remain a superpower. Based on the results of the 2002 election—when Republicans ran on military security—economic security might be a political winner. Conceivably, it might be more popular with voters than a return to traditional fiscal conservatism because it would subordinate the pain we face to national purpose. Might it be the secret destiny of Republican Party to become the political arm of a military-manufacturing-security complex like the one President Eisenhower warned of 40 years ago? ■

Robertson Morrow is a financial analyst in San Francisco.

In Praise of Free Love

Rethinking the sexual revolution

By Sam Torode

TO MANY PEOPLE TODAY, fertility is a disaster waiting to happen. Getting pregnant is like contracting a disease—thankfully, there's a pill to vaccinate against it. When accidents happen, men have it fairly easy. But it's no fun being a woman. What's desirable is to be free—to be like a man, able to enjoy sex all the time without getting pregnant.

This attitude is expressed well in a 1964 ad for Enovid, the first contraceptive pill:

From the beginning, woman has been a vassal to the temporal demands of the cyclic mechanism of her reproductive system. Now, to a degree heretofore unknown, she is permitted ... suspension of

cyclic function and procreative potential. This new method of control is symbolized in an illustration from ancient Greek mythology: Andromeda freed from her chains.

Most women seem to agree with this assessment: in America, nearly 80 percent of women born after 1945 have gone on the Pill at some point in their lives. Recognizing the scale of this revolution, the *Economist* named the Pill the greatest scientific advance of the 20th century.

But is the history of contraceptive advances really a story of liberation for women? Or is it a story of women's increasing bondage to pharmaceutical corporations and to men who want sex without responsibility?

According to the promoters of contraception, a woman is a slave to her cycle, and freedom comes from the mechanical control of fertility. As Margaret Sanger said in 1920, "Science must make woman the owner, the mistress of herself. Science, the only possible savior of mankind, must put it in the power of woman to decide for herself whether she will or will not become a mother."

Contrast this with the wisdom literature of ancient Egypt and Israel, which offers another perspective on fertility. In a hymn to Aton, Pharaoh Amenhotep IV sings,

All the beasts are content with their
pasturage;

Trees and plants are flourishing. ...

Creator of the seed in women,

Thou who makest fluid into man,

Who maintainest the son in the
womb of his mother. ...

How manifold it is, what thou hast
made!

In Amenhotep's view, fertility—both of the earth and of our bodies—is a mystery, a gift to be received joyfully. The Hebrew Scriptures agree:

Blessed are all who fear the Lord,
who walk in his ways. You will eat
the fruit of your labor; blessings
and prosperity will be yours.

Your wife will be like a fruitful vine
within your house; your sons will
be like olive shoots around your
table. (Psalm 128:1-3)

In the ancient view, a human being is not a machine but a person—a unity of soul and body. The wisdom of the past would caution us against artificially suppressing any part of the person—including her fertility.

Health is wholeness. It involves being connected, living in harmony with our

bodies, our environment, and our fellow human beings. Industrialism, however, tends toward division. Applied to sexuality, industrialism has fostered a separation between sex and fertility, which, in turn, has led to a separation between sex and marriage.

"Until recently," writes Wendell Berry, "there was no division between sexuality and fertility, because none was possible. This division was made possible by modern technology, which subjected human fertility, like the fertility of the earth, to a new kind of will: the technological will, which may not *necessarily* oppose the moral will, but which has not only tended to do so, but has tended to replace it."

"For the care or control of fertility," Berry continues, "we have allowed a technology of chemicals and devices to replace entirely the cultural means of ceremonial forms, disciplines, and restraints." It was through these cultural, or ecological, means that our ancestors harnessed and preserved sexual energy. These include the upholding of marriage as the proper context for sex and the discipline of periodic abstinence for the spacing of children.

INDUSTRIALISM HAS FOSTERED A SEPARATION BETWEEN **SEX AND FERTILITY**, WHICH HAS LED TO A SEPARATION BETWEEN **SEX AND MARRIAGE**.

A woman, with her cycle of fertility, is not a forest to be cleared or a mountain to be strip-mined. She is like a garden, yielding her fruits to the patience and care of the loving husbandman. Neither are children pests to be warded off with chemicals. Instead, they are a crowning gift of marriage, the visible fruits of a love too strong to be contained in just two bodies.

Even Gandhi believed that self-con-

trol was the only means of limiting fertility in accordance with human dignity. He writes in his autobiography,

The existence of the world depends on the reproductive act and since the world is God's domain, and a reflection of his power, this act must be subject to controls, the purpose of which is the continuation of life on earth. The man who understands this will strive at all costs to master his senses, arm himself with the knowledge that is necessary to the physical and spiritual welfare of his posterity, and transmit this knowledge to the future, for its benefit.

As Gandhi recognized, real sexual freedom doesn't come from contraceptives. It comes from honoring and guarding our sexuality, and situating it in the context of a loving marriage that's open to procreation.

Romantic love involves total self-abandonment. For a romance to flourish, year after year, it needs the promise of life-long fidelity and a commitment to something bigger than itself—a commitment to the raising up of children. Para-

doxically, we can only experience the freedom of love when we give ourselves away.

We've had a sexual revolution. What's needed now is a revolution of love. ■

Sam Torode is a freelance writer and artist who lives in rural Wisconsin. He and his wife Bethany are the authors of Open Embrace: A Protestant Couple Rethinks Contraception.

Who Is Playing Leviathan Now?

Finding Thomas Hobbes in bombed-out Baghdad

By Paul Gottfried

A BY NOW DEEPLY ingrained neoconservative practice consists of tracing back one's own wooden views to long-dead political theorists. That way it is possible to claim a pedigree for what otherwise might not hold our attention. For example, Michael Ledeen, in *Machiavelli on Modern Leadership*, has written a defense of Machiavelli's "iron rules" of statecraft, which is really a vindication of Ledeen's democratic imperialism. If Machiavelli had lived only a few centuries later, we are led to believe, he would have sided with Lincoln's war against slavery and would have happily signed up for Wilson's crusade to make the world safe for democracy. In a similar vein, George Will, in *Statecraft and Soulcraft*, brings up Aristotle and Burke to endorse an American welfare state. In *Neoconservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea*, Irving Kristol puts the ancient Stagirite to like use, in a demonstration of what might be called "Straussianism Lite." Even more recently, British historian Paul Johnson reached for his own usable classic when in *National Review* last fall he appealed to the spirit of Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan* (1651). Johnson was arguing for an American invasion of Iraq—or any place that may conceivably need "a constabulary enjoying full powers and global reach."

According to Johnson, "[T]he world is now too small and the weapons of the malefactors too devastating" for us to live without a "world policeman." Johnson builds his case by quoting Hobbes selectively, about the need for a sover-

eign, or what Johnson calls a "giant authority figure," to prevent the war of all against all. Whether Americans like it or not, their country is the "only constitutional Leviathan we have," and unlike Hobbes's autocratic sovereign, our president is a "constitutional ruler with an educated people of nearly 300 million behind him." That, according to Johnson, is why the terrorists attacked us, and why "the opponents of order throughout the world are so noisily opposed to Leviathan's protecting himself."

Johnson's references to Hobbes are no more than rhetorical flourishes. Sovereign states and individual sovereigns, as understood by Hobbes, do not function as global policemen but belong to particular commonwealths. The reason Hobbes in *Leviathan* treats the Catholic Church as the "kingdom of darkness" is the right claimed by its clergy to influence ethically those living outside of a Catholic commonwealth. For Hobbes, there were no acceptable arbiters of conscience or order outside of established sovereign states. And though one might become sovereign "by acquisition," by conquering a territory, someone who managed this would have to go on ruling and protecting his subjects (in return for their obedience). The Hobbesian conqueror, far from being a "world policeman," was expected to rule his own commonwealth and to contend with malefactors there. The Leviathan is not a free-floating metaphor but a term applied to a post-medieval conception of a multiplicity of states.

Leviathan, the great sea monster featured in the Book of Job, is made identical with the members of the state system that took shape in early modern Europe. One catches an echo of this Hobbesian view in the title that Hans Morgenthau gave to his textbook on international relations, *Politics Among Nations*. Morgenthau knew that he was writing as the political world that Hobbes had helped conceptualize was fading away. And he properly feared that a war of empires, linked to expansionist ideologies, would take its place.

There is another problem with extrapolating from Hobbes's notion of the state to justify an American global mission. As Michael Oakeshott demonstrates in his famous extended introduction to *Leviathan*, what Hobbes is doing is describing a civil association adapted to his view of human nature. The state, as Hobbes explains, is "a work of art," indeed "an artificial man made for the protection and salvation of the natural man to whom it is superior in power." Necessitating this "artifice" is the fact that human beings, as far as Hobbes could analyze their constant features, were restless in their desire of power and their "love of contention from competition." They were also, as far as Hobbes could figure out the human brain, matter in motion; and to whatever extent human perceptions matched up (or seemed to), that was the result of linguistic conventions and of what the French Hobbes scholar Raymond Polin calls "*raisonnement calculateur*," the

possibility of calculating individual advantage. Hobbes treated this last faculty as related to mathematical reasoning, which also yielded consensus about knowledge and procedural rules.

Despite this picture of a driven and self-centered human nature, which reflects his Augustinian Protestant upbringing, Hobbes also speaks about "passions that incline man to peace." "Fear of death, desire of such things that are necessary to commodious living, and a hope by their industry to obtain them" outweigh in some men vainglory and the restless desire for power and thereby create the conditions for civil society. For Oakeshott, the self-transcending aspect of man as a solitary being with appetites is that at some point he may be induced to forfeit his "natural right," to do as he pleases, and to turn his back on the state of nature—which is life without recognized authority—for the sake of a commonwealth. Because of an awareness of the benefits of tranquility, Oakeshott says, it is possible in the world as conceived by Hobbes to "erect a law-making authority," to raise up an "identifiable rule-maker," and to arrive at

tian faith with the "commandment to obey our civil sovereign, which we constituted over us by mutual pact one with another." The author of this passage fears religious differences precisely because they may lead to seditious violence and civil war, an ominous connection that he had seen developing in England as well as on the European continent. Such external conformity as he urged was intended to promote peace in a delimited space whose inhabitants were trying to avoid the effects of human contentiousness.

The latest attempts by our government to play the role that Paul Johnson would assign to it are not turning out well. Widespread looting, Shi'ite fanatics filling a power vacuum left by the downfall of the Ba'athists, and the collapse of public services in Iraq show that, with all due respect to Johnson, Mr. Bush may not be pushing forward "world order and peace." Indeed the U.S. may be reaping angry contempt as a headstrong bully, without gaining offsetting advantages. By now the gloomy scenario that Johnson evokes, of a world without the American Leviathan, a phantasmagoria

don't like? This right supposedly flows from the extent of our power and from the fact that our present (constitutionally derailed or evolved) regime is for some an exemplary democracy. Although, in my considered opinion, our military presence in the Middle East may be defended (more or less) by pointing to the danger of necessary fuel resources falling into hostile hands, the other arguments more typically made for our assault on Iraq, e.g., Saddam Hussein's involvement in the events of 9/11, the presumed weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and the moral imperative to spread our way of life, appear to be either unproved or downright silly.

In the most recent issue of *Independent Review*, economic historian Robert Higgs deals with the rising costs of playing global policeman. Between 2000 and the present, Defense Department outlays have risen 43 percent, going from \$281 billion to a projected budget for 2004 of \$399 billion. While Higgs expresses concern that it may be impossible to control such costs, as long as the public is enamored of the war against terrorism and as long as arms industries are pulling in profits, it would seem that the project in question is not indefinitely expandable. Can the federal government continue to raise military outlays, to fund new wars or to go on paying for old ones, without suffering negative consequences? Since April, the president's popularity has dropped by about eight points, and it may be naïve to imagine that he can recoup his losses by listening to Paul Johnson or Michael Ledeen. Would that our government took seriously the real *Leviathan* and not the comic-book version found in *National Review*! ■

Paul Gottfried is a professor of humanities at Elizabethtown College and the author of Multiculturalism and the Politics of Guilt.

THE U.S. MAY BE REAPING ANGRY CONTEMPT AS A HEADSTRONG BULLY, WITHOUT GAINING OFFSETTING ADVANTAGES.

a "procedure of adjudication with the assurance that rules cannot be breached with impunity."

But what this state-building involves is a modest project of a kind that excludes ideological enthusiasm. If Hobbes, in the third part of *Leviathan*, "Of Christian Commonwealth," stresses the need to have subjects outwardly conform to the religious persuasion of the state sovereign, it is amply clear that this requirement is not dictated by theological zeal. Again and again, Hobbes identifies Chris-

of "wolf and jackal states" that "quickly emerge to prey on their neighbors," may be actually occurring in post-Saddam Iraq. It is a state of affairs that our armies might have advanced by toppling a functionally necessary tyrant.

Equally significant, the *carte blanche* that American imperialists and their predominantly British backers wish to give our government, to overrun other countries, is profoundly hypocritical. Why should the U.S. have a moral right to violate the sovereignty of countries we

Nothing to Declare

One nation is more favored than others.

By William von Raab

I REMEMBER BACK in the '80s when Daniel Oliver, an old friend who is now chairman of *National Review*, and I had dinner with a group of Reagan-administration "conservatives." At one point, the question was passed around the table: "When did you become a conservative?" Daniel and I were stunned. Neither of us had ever known anything else. The others, however, including many of today's neocon central committee, made Oprah-style confessions about their conversions just months or years before. So there we were, a pair of traditional conservatives amid a crowd of converted lefties who had turned Right on their way from Democratic senators' offices to President Reagan's White House.

But we all had a common and real enemy out there: the Soviet Union. Their war was our war. Finish off the Communists. Cripple their economy by depriving them of any access to critical technology. But the soon to be *soi-disant* neocons also had a bigger goal, one we did not see at the time: make the United States protector of the western world, plus some. This is a tale of just how well and quickly their strategic plan and power were moving.

In addition to helping lead the misnamed "War on Drugs," a major responsibility of my job as Commissioner of Customs was to enforce our laws against the smuggling of critical technology out of the country. Although most of this was headed to the eastern bloc, some was headed to other forbidden places.

The government's program to block this smuggling and break the Soviet Union was called, ironically as this story will tell, "Operation Exodus."

The project was basically run by a committee of three: Richard Perle of the Defense Department, someone from the State Department whose name I forget (an indication of how useful he was), and me. I was the Enforcer. Take no prisoners. Or so I thought.

One day, sitting in my grand office, I received a request to see my boss, Treasury Secretary James Baker. Although Baker and I were good friends, we were not exactly philosophical kin fellows. A request that I drop over was therefore not a great beginning to the day.

"You've got a serious problem, Willy," Baker said. "George Schultz spoke to me this morning at breakfast about one of your operations. He has been led to believe that you and your agents are harassing Israelis. Do you know what he is talking about?"

Luckily, I did have some idea what he was talking about. The previous week, Customs agents in California had arrested a handful of Israeli citizens who had been caught red-handed with the complete ingredients for cluster bombs. These bombs were not just lethal and nasty anti-personnel weapons but were also at the time highly classified. Lethality is a concern. Top Secret is a crisis. What our agents did not know, however, was that these men were Israeli agents. For that matter, the boys at Langley did not know either.

Israeli sympathizers with good connections inside the Beltway and George Schultz's dining room decided that Operation Exodus had wandered too far south of the Fulda Gap. They packaged these arrests with a series of other Israeli arrests for similar actions to show, not a pattern of criminal activity by foreign agents, but harassment by U.S. Customs agents against nice guys. That the activities for which the arrests had been made were serious and illegal was apparently irrelevant. When citizens of other countries break our laws, the countries in question can find themselves in hot water. With Israel, the rules were very different. I was the one in serious trouble.

Baker was a good sport about the matter. He said that he certainly knew that I was not targeting Israelis but felt that I had better clear up the charges made against me.

Secretary of State Schultz was never my cup of tea nor I his. When I closed the border with Mexico over the capture, torture, and subsequent murder of a U.S. agent by the Mexican police, he went to President Reagan to get me fired. The president took my side. When I described the State Department as having "acquired an institutional form of Alzheimer's disease" over being soft on East Germany's support of terrorism, he told the president I was a troglodyte. Chief of Staff Don Regan laughed heartily, and Schultz scowled. Now he was casting me as an Israel hater. At least my victims were getting better, from Mexican police to German Vopos to Israeli Mossad!

Had James Baker not been so concerned, I would have left George Schultz to ponder his fantasies about legalizing drugs. Instead, I began trying to puzzle my way out of this pickle.

Some years before, I had been Vice President for Administration at New York University, which, in many respects, was run by Catholics and supported by Jews. They were some of the smartest and amusing people with whom I had ever worked. Surely, my old pals at NYU would find my predicament funny and would have a clever plan of escape.

Their solution was simple. Just bring my case to the most important member of the Jewish community that I could reach. With a little bit of help and introduction, I was scheduled to meet with Morris Abram, the chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations, a sort of Old-Testament papal figure in New York. He was a Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations, a man of considerable influence.

It was set. The Commissioner of Customs would set out for Canossa in a week.

But what in the world would I say when I got there? I knew how to brief the President of the United States but not Ambassador Abram. My quandary was solved, however, by the man in charge of all Customs agents, Assistant Commissioner Bill Rosenblatt. He told me not to worry. He would handle the meeting.

In the taxi from the airport to Manhattan, I asked Rosenblatt what the plan was. He pulled out a loose-leaf binder marked Top Secret. All the pages bound inside were also marked Top Secret. "What the hell are you doing?" I cried. "Don't worry," he said. "This is just a bunch of routine reports that I stamped Top Secret. There is nothing even Confidential in here. I know these fellows. He will like this, feel he is being brought in on the real information, and send us on our merry way."

Ambassador Abram was a charming and avuncular man. I liked him right away. Best of all, he liked the Top Secret binder. Rosenblatt was right. Amba-

sador Abram was deeply pleased that he was being given a look inside our Operation Exodus. He further seemed to catch on quickly that I was not running anti-Israeli hit teams.

We returned to Washington. James Baker was pleased. George Schultz was appeased. The Israeli agents were never

prosecuted—the cases against them vanished like water into sand. As for the neocons, they finally made it to Damascus. I only got to Canossa. ■

William von Raab was the U.S. Commissioner of Customs during the Reagan and first Bush administrations.

This Land is Your Land

Taking a Stand with the Southern Agrarians

By Mark Royden Winchell

ON OCT. 30 AND 31, 1980, a group of scholars and other interested persons gathered on the campus of Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tenn. to celebrate the 50th anniversary of an unusual book. In November 1930, Harper and Brothers published *I'll Take My Stand: The South and the Agrarian Tradition*. The driving forces behind this volume were four poets who had been associated with each other at Vanderbilt a decade earlier and had been instrumental in publishing the *Fugitive: A Magazine of Poetry* from 1923-25. Up until 1925, John Crowe Ransom, Allen Tate, Donald Davidson, and Robert Penn Warren had been primarily interested in literature and largely indifferent to economic and social issues. During the second half of the 1920s, however, they became increasingly conscious of their identity as Southerners and their social responsibility as Southern intellectuals. Although the reasons for this growing regional consciousness were as diverse as the men themselves, the great external catalyst was undoubtedly the scorn heaped upon the South as a result of the Scopes Monkey Trial in the summer of 1925. Thinking Southerners either had

to agree with the characterization of traditional Southern culture as backward and unenlightened or formulate a philosophically cogent defense of that culture. The New South liberals of Chapel Hill, N.C., and elsewhere chose apology and assimilation. Ransom, Tate, Davidson, and Warren chose explanation and defense.

In addition to the four major *Fugitive* poets, eight other like-minded Southerners contributed to *I'll Take My Stand*. In opposing modernity, especially industrialization, these 12 appeared defiantly out of step with their age. In the best of times, they would have been accused of reactionary sentimentality. Coming 13 months into the Great Depression, their book was widely scorned as a formula for social and economic disaster. At a time when many desperate people were willing to entertain radical left-wing solutions to the national crisis, the Agrarian program had few adherents.

In one sense, the debate between the Agrarians and their progressive adversaries (including the administration of Vanderbilt University itself) was a variation on the 150-year-old debate between Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jeffer-

son. By 1930, the Hamiltonian vision had triumphed everywhere in the United States except for the South and a few isolated pockets of rural culture elsewhere in the country. Advocates of the New South wanted to make that victory total. The Agrarians, however, believed that the Faustian bargain being offered to the South would result in the region giving up too much for too little. (It is

Lanier (one of three surviving contributors to *I'll Take My Stand*) made several favorable references to the environmental scientist Barry Commoner, presidential candidate of the ultra-left-wing Citizen's Party. One might have wondered whether the extreme conservatism of 1930 had become the cutting-edge radicalism of 1980.

In 1930, industrialism and progress

even saying bad things about *I'll Take My Stand*. They were simply ignoring it. And the primary spokesmen for the group had neither the money nor the contacts necessary to create a political infrastructure. Then, when things seemed hopeless, the Agrarians found a sympathetic ear in the New York editor Seward Collins. From 1933-36, they published over 70 articles and reviews in his magazine, the *American Review*. A man of intense but transitory enthusiasms, Collins was briefly attracted to Agrarianism as an alternative to the seemingly doomed system of democratic capitalism. When he switched his allegiance to Italian fascism, however, the Agrarians cut their ties with Collins and began looking for new allies. The result was a liaison with the Kentucky journalist Herbert Agar.

While serving as London correspondent for the *Louisville Courier-Journal* from 1929-33, Agar discovered the British Distributist movement. Although the Agrarians had probably never heard of the Distributists at the time they published *I'll Take My Stand*, the two groups shared several key principles. These included opposition to the dehumanizing effects of industrialism and a fear that greater economic centralization would result in diminished personal liberty. Because the Distributists—G. K. Chesterton, Hillaire Belloc, and others—were overwhelmingly Catholic, they attributed the excesses of capitalism to the spirit of Protestant individualism. In 1936, a coalition of Agrarians, Distributists, and other economic devolutionists published a collection of essays called *Who Owns America?: A New Declaration of Independence*.

With 21 essays, *Who Owns America?* was a more diverse collection than *I'll Take My Stand*. Because Herbert Agar (who co-edited the volume with Allen Tate) was consciously trying to influence the Roosevelt administration, the book is filled with the policy wonkery of

THE AGRARIANS WERE NOT CONTENT WITH CONSERVING THE EXISTING CONSENSUS—THEY WANTED TO TURN THE CLOCK BACK.

doubtful that even they could have imagined the contemporary Sunbelt, with indistinguishable shopping malls stretching from Phoenix to Atlanta and a landscape of high-rise hotels with revolving restaurants on top.) Although their warning went largely unheeded at the time, *I'll Take My Stand* remains in print over seven decades later, even as more topical social manifestos have been largely forgotten.

If Agrarianism had seemed quixotic in 1930, it was virtually incomprehensible to the politics of 1980. The movement was originally understood to be an extreme manifestation of Southern conservatism. On the Tuesday after the Vanderbilt symposium, however, the first president elected from the Deep South since James K. Polk was defeated for re-election by the widely acknowledged conservative candidate. One suspects that both Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan would have troubled the Agrarians. A nuclear engineer and agribusinessman, Carter was clearly a product of the New South. (Eugene McCarthy once called him a "third-generation Snopes.") Reagan, on the other hand, was the favorite of industrialists, who talked the talk of *laissez-faire* capitalism while walking the walk of corporate welfare. During a discussion session at the 1980 conference, Lyle

were widely considered to be synonymous. Therefore, anyone who opposed industrialism was conservative, if not downright reactionary. But as the ravages of pollution and urbanization became apparent, those who preached concern for the natural and human environment increasingly came to be labeled socialists or worse. Socialism, however, depends on centralized solutions to national problems. Like most traditional Southerners, the Agrarians favored local control of local communities. One is tempted to think of Agrarianism as an early example of Left-Conservatism, which, according to Norman Mailer, involves thinking "in the style of Karl Marx in order to attain certain values suggested by Edmund Burke," except that the Agrarians were more radical than Marx and more conservative than Burke. If Marx detested capitalism, he saw it as a necessary and inevitable prelude to socialism. Precisely because they agreed with this analysis, the Agrarians were not content with conserving the existing consensus—they wanted to turn the clock back to a time before huge economic power had been concentrated in the hands of corporate capitalists and government bureaucrats.

By 1933, the Agrarian movement seemed dead. Critics were no longer

a bygone age. Nevertheless, the passion for decentralization that runs through its pages is as timely today as it was in 1936. (The Intercollegiate Studies Institute issued a handsome reprinting of the book in 1999.) This is true in large part because it helps to explain differences in the conservative movement that are far more apparent in 2003 than they were when the Agrarians celebrated their semicentennial in 1980.

One of the fundamental differences among conservatives since the breakup of the Reagan coalition has been over the size and power of government. Historically, Southerners have distrusted centralized authority in Washington. If that used to be the universally held conservative position, it is no longer the case. Neoconservatives and other establishment figures see themselves as nationalists and internationalists. If Southerners are not the only people who argue for decentralization, they are the only ones who fought a war over that principle. It is surely no accident that the battle flag of the Confederacy has become the unofficial banner of devolutionists from the breakaway states of the former Soviet Union to the Quebec separatists in Canada.

As several of the Agrarians and their allies sought to break up concentrations of wealth and property, others focused on the dangers of concentrated government. Two years after the appearance of *Who Owns America?* Donald Davidson published a book of essays called *The Attack on Leviathan: Regionalism and Nationalism in the United States*. In 1989, Russell Kirk recalled happening on this book while browsing through the library at Michigan State as an "earnest sophomore" over 50 years earlier. "It was written eloquently," Kirk notes, "and for me it made coherent the misgivings I had felt concerning the political notions popular in the 1930s. The book was so good that I assumed all intelli-

gent Americans, or almost all, were reading it." In fact, *The Attack on Leviathan* was remaindered after selling only a few hundred copies in the decade after publication. It has been reissued at least twice, however, most recently in 1991 by Transaction Publishers as part of Kirk's Library of Conservative Thought.

One of the essays appearing in *The Attack on Leviathan* had been Davidson's contribution to *Who Owns America?* Its title, "That This Nation May Endure: The Need for Political Regionalism," ironically alludes to Lincoln's obsession with preserving the political integrity of the union but offers a much different prescription for achieving that end. By this point in his career, Davidson had become convinced that America was neither "one nation indivisible" nor an association of sovereign states but a congeries of regional cultures. National unity could be preserved only if that fact were acknowledged and respected. Although the issue of secession had been settled by the Civil War, regional differences had not been obliterated. The subjugation of the South by the federal army

genial face. The Agrarians believed that industrialism, with its promise of the good life, did wear such a face.

Nearly seven decades after Davidson wrote his defense of regionalism, one is struck by his celebration of cultural diversity. In the last decade of the 20th century, that concept became a shibboleth of the cultural Left. In practical terms, "diversity" all too often came to mean a racial and ethnic spoils system enforced by the protocols of political correctness. The idea of a national or American culture, which had once been championed by political liberals, now came to be seen as a conservative (or perhaps neoconservative) notion. It is interesting, though probably pointless, to wonder whether Davidson would have altered his vocabulary had he lived to see the cause of multiculturalism extolled by black race hustlers, radical feminists, and militant homosexuals.

We now live in an age when a reconstituted remnant of the Old Right is questioning the rapacity of multinational corporations, which subordinate every other human value to the profit motive.

ONE OF THE DIFFERENCES AMONG CONSERVATIVES SINCE THE BREAKUP OF THE REAGAN COALITION HAS BEEN OVER THE SIZE AND POWER OF GOVERNMENT.

was a military act with political consequences, but it could not impose an alien culture on a conquered territory. To use a distinction popular in our own time, the unionists were authoritarians interested only in political control. The totalitarian sensibility, however, insists on controlling the hearts and minds of people as well. In the 1930s, Nazism and Communism unmistakably posed that threat by joining the totalitarian sensibility with the brute power of the state. But totalitarianism is perhaps even more insidious when it wears a benign and

These same paleoconservatives are also challenging a concept of nationalism that requires uniformity at home and imperialism abroad. In performing their cautionary role, however, they find themselves at odds with what passes for the national conservative consensus. (Former *Commentary* editor Norman Podhoretz has written that the paleoconservatives have been on the wrong side of all the important cultural issues because they were too heavily influenced by T. S. Eliot and the Agrarians, "who despised capitalism, industrialism,

and bourgeois democracy.") In this battle, the Agrarians can provide much intellectual sustenance.

While we should certainly go back and rediscover Agrarianism for ourselves, its principles have never totally disappeared from conservative thought. Richard M. Weaver, who is considered one of the founding fathers of modern conservatism, was influenced by John Crowe Ransom and Donald Davidson at Vanderbilt and by Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren at Louisiana State. (Weaver is sometimes called the Saint Paul of the Agrarian movement—too young to have been one of the original 12 but the most effective evangelist of the cause.) M.E. Bradford studied under Davidson at Vanderbilt and did more than any other scholar of our time to demonstrate the relevance of traditional Southern values to contemporary political issues. As we have seen, Russell Kirk, who taught us all that there is such a thing as a conservative mind, was a Northern admirer of the Agrarians.

Certainly, one of the challenges now facing any political philosophy is to find a way to achieve harmony in an increasingly pluralistic society. Properly understood, the qualities of diversity and tolerance are more natural to a conservative than to a schematic leftist mindset. Among his "six canons of conservative thought," Kirk identifies an "affection for the proliferating variety and mystery of traditional life as distinguished from the narrowing uniformity and equalitarianism and utilitarian aims of most radical systems." Decentralization—political, cultural, and economic—is one way of maintaining and enhancing that proliferating variety. As the copperhead poet Robert Frost reminds us, "good fences make good neighbors." ■

Mark Rayden Winchell's latest book is Too Good to Be True: The Life and Work of Leslie Fielder.

Are We Safer?

Why Bush's terror chief resigned before the war

By Arnaud de Borchgrave

- Did the war to change regimes in Iraq jeopardize the war on terror?
- Did the war on Iraq detract from Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan?
- Did the war on Iraq rob domestic security of manpower, brainpower, and funds?
- Did the war on Iraq weaken the administration's counterterrorism alliances abroad? Did the war on Iraq spawn a new generation of al-Qaeda recruits?
- Did the administration fail to push the Saudis hard enough to address their own terrorism problems?
- Did the war detract from America's international prestige and respect?
- Did the war jeopardize the ideals America stands for?

The way the three wars—al-Qaeda, Iraq, and Afghanistan—are being reported, the answer would have to be affirmative to all eight questions. And most foreign editorials, from Buenos Aires to Berlin and from Copenhagen to Cape Town, have reached that conclusion.

Administration officials are quick to dismiss these foreign fulminations as gratuitous Bush-bashing. Trouble is, former administration officials for two presidents, Ronald Reagan and George Bush 41, make the same points and ask the same questions, albeit *sub rosa* and *sotto voce*. None—Democrat or Republican—wants motivations and patriotism impugned.

Until now, that is. Rand Beers—the man who succeeded the legendary Richard Clarke as the White House counterterrorist czar and mysteriously quit after eight months on the job—has gone public. Having served in three Republican administrations, including Reagan and Bush 41, Beers scanned from 500 to 1,000 pieces of "threat information" intelligence that crossed his desk daily—and nightly. He has since joined the John Kerry for president camp and spilled a few beans to the *Washington Post*—sufficient evidence for Bush loyalists that he was a traitor in their midst.

But former ranking Republican officials are also faulting the current administration for failure to anticipate Iraq's post-war problems. "We should have declared a victory," said one ex-White-House and Defense official, "and started pulling out right after Baghdad fell. Now we're trying to get other friendly powers to share the policing burden but Iraq is already a tar baby." Two months after President Bush declared the war over, the Pentagon budget assumptions expected to have cut back boots on Iraqi soil to 75,000 troops. Instead, some 150,000 are still deployed.

Republican strategists are ruing the day when more soldiers will have been killed in peacetime action than in the three-week war. Rosy forecasts of Iraqi oil fields pumping out almost three million barrels a day by the end of 2003 and five million by the following summer have snaffled. Some Republicans can see an economy still heading south and

a budget deficit soaring over \$400 billion for the year.

The House of Saud has also taken a heady plunge back to earth. Recent terrorist bombings in Riyadh by Islamist extremists shook the royal family as Sept. 11 never did. Some 100 prominent imams who preach *jihad* against Christian and Jewish heathens have been called on the royal carpet and told to knock it off. Asked why this wasn't done immediately after Sept. 11, Saudi spokesmen deflect the question with "and look at what else we've done."

The Wahhabi school curriculum is also being revised to eliminate all hateful references to Jews and Christians. For the first time in recent memory, Saudis now tell their American friends they feel sufficiently confident to tell the religious police to mind their own business when their wives are scolded for allowing hair to show.

Millions of Saudi-educated youth—as opposed to U.S.-educated elites—and millions of Pakistanis in the Saudi Wahhabi clergy-funded madrasas have been brainwashed to believe that America and Israel are intrinsically evil. This teaching has gone on since 1979, when the House of Saud reached a "concordat" with the fundamentalist Wahhabi clergy whereby the clerics pledged not to criticize the extravagant excesses of the royal family, and in return, the religious chiefs were given free rein to spread their gospel throughout the desert kingdom—and in countries far and near.

The Pakistani fundamentalist bandwagon got rolling in 1980, as the Soviets completed their occupation in Afghanistan. The United States, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan came up with a great idea to defeat the Soviet army of occupation. They agreed to try to undermine the loyalty of Soviet troops—at first, most of the units were drawn from the Soviet Union's Muslim republics adjoining

Afghanistan—by flooding them with the Koran and cheap drugs.

After the Soviets conceded defeat and pulled out of Afghanistan in February 1989, the message of hate was turned against the United States—for leaving Afghanistan in the lurch and for punishing Pakistan for its secret nuclear buildup.

Dick Clarke understood the global context of al-Qaeda. He also knew there was no nexus between the charnel

house of Saddam Hussein and the global terrorism of Osama bin Laden. The invasion of Iraq, like Afghanistan a Muslim country, could only spawn more fresh recruits for al-Qaeda.

Maybe Rand Beers is on to something. ■

Arnaud de Borchgrave is editor at large of United Press International.

Copyright © 2003 United Press International

Mend Fences in Sudan

Khartoum has no place on the terrorism list.

By Robin Birley

AMONG THE LESSER-KNOWN problems handed to President Bush by his predecessor is the Clinton administration's failed policy towards Africa's largest country, Sudan. Rather than confronting pressing human rights concerns, Clinton instead chose to blacklist the Sudanese as Islamic terrorists, thus setting in motion a series of missed opportunities that came back to haunt us in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.

At a micro-level, Clinton's bungling in Sudan alienated an Islamic country that for much of the '90s sought to establish links to the U.S. At a macro-level, his cry-wolf approach to terrorism, and intelligence failures affected international perceptions of American foreign policy, accounting at least in part for the sluggish international response to the war on terror.

In a spin of mixed messages, at the same time the then American ambassador to Sudan was describing the Sudanese as the "nicest people" in eastern Africa, the Clinton administration sought

to isolate Sudan's government by listing it as a state sponsor of terrorism in August 1993. Former President Jimmy Carter established very shortly afterwards, however, that the administration had no intelligence, let alone evidence, to support this listing: "In fact, when I later asked an assistant secretary of state he said they did not have any proof, but there were strong allegations." Interestingly, the American ambassador to Sudan at the time, Donald Petterson, also said that he was "surprised" at the listing. Washington's closest ally in the war on terrorism, Britain, starkly contradicts what was an essentially political listing, stating, for example, "there is no evidence to suggest that Sudan is a state sponsor of terrorism."

This was confirmed by the fact that over 100 CIA reports alleging Sudanese involvement in terrorism were subsequently revealed to have been false. These included, among other claims, allegations that the Sudanese were planning to attack the American embassy in

Khartoum and to assassinate National Security Advisor Anthony Lake. The embassy was partially and then totally closed, and Lake went into hiding for several months. After no threat materialized, the American embassy was reopened and a somewhat sheepish Anthony Lake resurfaced.

Withdrawing over 100 reports represented a massive, systemic intelligence failure, and American credibility was further damaged by the farcical 1998 cruise missile attack on the al-Shifa aspirin factory. As if this were not enough, in the wake of 9/11, it emerged that far from supporting terrorism, Sudan had sought to extradite Osama bin Laden to the United States in 1996. This was refused by Washington, as were Khartoum's repeated offers from 1997 onwards to co-operate in counterterrorism, especially with regard to al-Qaeda. Also refused, for several years, were repeated requests for an unfettered American counterterrorist presence in Khartoum. (U.S. teams eventually established a full-time presence in

Sudan in 2000.) Senators Arlen Specter (R-Penn.) and Richard Shelby (R-Ala.) confirmed that Sudan has been "allowing unlimited, unannounced visits to any location, to break locks, inspect and photograph." Specter described Sudan's co-operation as "model."

This is not to say that Sudan should enjoy the embrace afforded other allies, as it remains an Islamist state that has not held multi-party elections since the ruling junta took power in 1989. A 20-year civil war between the Muslim north and the Christian south has left two million dead and four million displaced, over 11,000 are currently listed as having been sold into slavery, and Freedom House reports that "no place on earth is religious persecution more brutal." Just last month, government forces attacked nine southern villages in a night assault that killed 59, including unarmed women and children. A Presbyterian minister was massacred alongside his young sons, and his wife is still missing.

In a recent meeting with Sudan's Foreign Minister Mustafa Ismail, Secretary of State Colin Powell pronounced the administration "pleased with steps Sudan has taken in the war on terrorism," though he also transmitted a report to Congress citing "various types of violent actions against civilians ... used to compel their displacement ... including killing, rape, abduction, burning of shelters, and looting of property."

Thus the misdiagnosis continues. Sudan still ranks on our official list of state sponsors of international terror while its domestic situation further deteriorates—and we seem uncertain where to weigh in on a conflict both religious and cultural as black Africans in the south seek independence from their Arabic-speaking government. In the past, in an attempt to isolate the regime and aid the 15-percent Christian minority (which controls the country's oil reserves), the U.S. has quietly supported

the rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army, a leftist group born of the Marxist Mengistu regime in Ethiopia and described by the *New York Times* as "brutal and predatory." In a series of other poor fits, we have also provided "non-lethal military assistance" to Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda to aid in the overthrow of the Khartoum regime.

The first glimmer in a long night came last July when the government agreed to a southern referendum on autonomy and limitation on the imposition of Islamic law, followed in October by a ceasefire agreement negotiated in Kenya. But the vote has not happened, and incursions have continued. Khartoum now promises another ceasefire by the end of this month, and Egypt is sponsoring peace talks.

For America's part, engaging Sudan with realistic caution is both shrewd politics and the right thing to do as we have every interest in seeing an end to what the U.S. Agency for International Development has called "the world's greatest humanitarian crisis." Sudan is a nation of 20 million, with a landmass larger than all of Western Europe and tremendous natural resources, including proven oil reserves, minerals, water, and considerable agricultural potential. Its location is also strategically significant: headquarters for the U.S. Combined Joint task Force, it is just 250 miles from Saudi Arabia, holds key Red Sea ports, and controls both the Blue and White Niles, Egypt's lifeblood.

This country riven by ongoing strife and ugly history will have much to overcome if its factions are to live in peace, but Sudan does not need its ills compounded by being kept on a terror list on which it has earned no place. The U.S. should take that first step—then call on Sudan to take many more. ■

Robin Birley is a London businessman with a farm in Mozambique.

The American Conservative

is interviewing candidates for a new staff writer position. Applicants should have good reporting skills, compatible personality and politics.

Send résumé, cover letter, and clips to:
khopkins@amconmag.com

Arts & Letters

FILM

[Together]

Undoing Mao's Work

By Steve Sailer

"TOGETHER" IS AN optimistic little Mandarin-language film about the Westernization of the Chinese soul from the director of the 1993 hit "Farewell, My Concubine," Chen Kaige. In 1966, Mao's Red Guard smashed up his family's collection of Western classical records and forced young Chen publicly to denounce his filmmaker father as a running dog counter-revolutionary.

Since Mao went to his reward, European art music has rebounded tremendously in China. While classical music is slowly withering in the West, it is finding a new home in the East. Asia has produced countless young technical virtuosi, but "Together" acknowledges that often their nimble fingers and admirable work ethics have not been matched by the emotional depths required by the 19th-century Romantic repertoire.

In "Together," a working-class father and his 13-year-old son move to Beijing to find a violin teacher who can help the prodigy fulfill his staggering potential.

The lad soon develops a crush on an adorable neighbor named Lili, a courtesan played by Chen Hong, the director's wife. Unlike all the Asian beauties in Hollywood movies these days, Lili isn't into kung fu fighting. She seems more likely to launch into Rodgers & Hammerstein's "I Enjoy Being a Girl" than to kick bad guys.

Lili owns a poster of her role model, Marilyn Monroe's Lorelei Lee in "Gentlemen Prefer Blondes," but this brunette gold-digger has a heart of gold. She truly loves her boyfriend, a businessman who turns out to be neither rich nor faithful.

She treats the kid fiddler like a little brother, but he is smitten. When they happen upon her boyfriend dining with another woman, she rushes off for some shopping therapy, trying on an extravagant fur coat.

Meanwhile, the boy's endearingly bumptious father has talked a famous star-making violin instructor, played by the director Chen, into giving his boy an audition. The maestro already has an adolescent girl pupil living with his family in their spacious high-rise apartment. While her technique is flawless, she lacks the fiery passions the music demands.

At the try-out, the loving father is shocked to discover his son's violin case is empty. The boy had sold the

Instead, Chen hopes Western classical music can educate his people in spirituality and individualism. "One of the biggest differences between Chinese and Western culture," Chen said in an interview with MovieWeb.com, "is that we don't have religion. We don't worship anything. Western classical music has elements of love and forgiveness that come from religion. Chinese music is very intellectual, very exotic, but there is no love. You don't feel warm after you listen to it."

The cult of the Romantic hero, as exemplified by virtuosi like Franz Liszt, first emerged in a Christian culture whose theology valued each unique soul, rather than a Confucian culture that emphasized orderly social relations.

"I always hope one day we'll see real individuals in Chinese society," Chen remarked. "But we have to hope for the young generation; it's too late for my generation to become real individuals. 'Indi-

WESTERN CLASSICAL MUSIC HAS ELEMENTS THAT COME FROM RELIGION.

CHINESE MUSIC IS VERY INTELLECTUAL, VERY EXOTIC, BUT THERE IS NO LOVE.

instrument upon which his entire future depends to buy Lili the fur coat she'd admired. Strikingly, the professor decides the boy isn't just another dutiful automaton like his current protégée but a true romantic who can do justice to a Tchaikovsky violin concerto.

Some American critics have praised "Together" for attacking modern China for becoming too materialistic, too conformist, too American. But that merely reflects the self-absorbed ignorance of anti-Western Westerners who confuse the unworldly Tibetan Buddhists with the worldly Chinese. The Chinese have never needed foreigners to teach them how to be materialistic.

vidual' is a bad word in China. ... Why did I denounce my father? Because of the fear I would be kicked out of society."

Still, as admirable as "Together" is in intent, the lead role requires more than Tang Yun, or any 13-year-old, could be expected to deliver. It's easy to cast a film about a pianist because you can just shoot your movie star's face looking soulful, then cut to a close-up of some anonymous musician's hands tickling the ivories. Violin talent, though, is much harder to fake because a fiddler keeps his hands inconveniently close to his face.

So Chen had to find a youth who was both an outstanding violinist and had "very sad eyes," then try (with only par-

tial success) to teach him to radiate rare intensity of feeling.

Granted, the boy is at least as expressive as the opaque Adrien Brody is in "The Pianist." The Oscar-winner's blank stares, however, were directed toward scenes of historic horror, which encouraged the audience to imagine the pianist must be feeling something profound on the inside. In contrast, the upwardly mobile world the violinist gazes upon steadily is rather cheerful and lacking in incident, making it hard for us to impute that he's feeling thunderously Romantic emotions. ■

Rated PG. Suitable for children who can stand subtitles.
Copyright © 2003 United Press International

BOOKS

[Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors 1948-1953, Jonathan Brent and Vladimir Naumov, HarperCollins, 416 pages]

Joe Bananas

By R.J. Stove

FORGET CHEAP DICKENSIAN antitheses. It was the worst of times, it was the worst of times. Between 1948 and 1953 the chief lunatic of Soviet Russia's insane asylum planned another mass primal-scream session, at least as spectacular as the 1930s bouts of Moscow show-trial therapy. Only now, with *Stalin's Last Crime*, are most readers in a position to perceive how near Uncle Joe came to achieving his valiant goal. This harrowing, unforgettable account dwells, as its authors themselves observe, "in the borderland between Marx Brothers absurdity and Shakespearean tragedy." It provides an improbable assurance that major commercial publishers can still issue serious historical research, as opposed to what Garry Wills and Daniel Goldhagen peddle.

Before the 1940s, Stalin's public attitudes towards Jews in general consisted of unabashed spite followed by comparative prudence. At a 1907 congress he cheerily urged, to weed out Mensheviks, "a pogrom within the party": language that sounded rather insensitive even in 1907. Afterwards Stalin minded his tongue with greater skill, not least because many leading Bolsheviks were Jews, and even those who were Gentiles (Sergei Kirov, V.M. Molotov, and Kliment Voroshilov, to name three of the most renowned) had Jewish wives. We find him, in his dictatorship's early years, making anti-Semitic behavior punishable by imprisonment or death and deeming such behavior "the most dangerous vestige of cannibalism." (Not for him, by this stage, Khrushchev's folksy candor in complaining to Poland's Communist leadership, "You have already too many Abramoviches.") The Order of Lenin's 1939 recipients included a batch of writers in Yiddish; Trotsky himself stopped short of bemoaning any anti-Jewish malice on Stalin's part; as late as 1948, Jews accounted for 40 out of 190 Stalin-Prize recipients. Yet restrictions on Jews' employment within the Soviet bureaucracy had begun during the Second World War. Snarls in *Pravda* editorials against "rootless cosmopolites" started in 1947. And Golda Meir's visit to Moscow—where she attracted frenzied crowds that could have been easily enough dispersed by Stalin's fiat—occurred only months after the assassination (sorry, comrades, "fatal car crash") of Jewish Antifascist Committee boss Solomon Mikhoels.

Much as Kirov's murder served as the immediate pretext for the 1930s purges, so the origins of the "Doctors' Plot" lay in the August 1948 demise of Andrei Zhdanov, who for most of the previous two years had been among Stalin's most internationally notorious henchmen, principally for his crusade against any poet, novelist, or composer with the slightest capacity for creative independence. Zhdanov's tirades had included his description (in a perverse way, immortal) of Anna Akhmatova as "a nun or a

whore—or rather both a nun and a whore who combines harlotry with prayer." Even Brent and Naumov, incidentally, cannot surpass Clive James's analysis of Zhdanov's diatribes:

Reading his [Zhdanov's] smug prose is like being vouchsafed a glimpse into the mind of an obscene phone-caller, except that the range of ambition not merely encompasses the disturbance of your domestic innocence but includes starvation, torture, bitter cold and a broken back.

Lavish mourning in unctuous official prose and verse marked Zhdanov's death ("You went your glorious way, Comrade Zhdanov, / Leaving eternal footsteps behind," lamented one *Pravda* poetaster). Such agitprop glossed over the awkward reality that Zhdanov's career had been on the skids for months, partly because his son Yuri had politely criticized T.D. Lysenko's pseudo-science, then at its specious glory's zenith. Yuri eventually reinstated himself in officialdom's good graces, going so far as to marry Stalin's daughter Svetlana. Zhdanov Senior proved less fortunate, though Stalin spared him such vulgarly humdrum garbage-disposal methods as a bullet in the neck. A victim of chronic heart disease, Zhdanov spent his last weeks at the mercy of doctors who—in Brent's and Naumov's own words—"took no positive steps to murder [him, but] ... took a series of negative steps that demonstrated that they had undertaken their assignment—the [electrocardiogram] technician was not replaced for three weeks, the nursing care was negligent, they did not take standard precautions."

Once the obsequies for the late Commissar of Culture had ended, more than two years elapsed before his fate became a live political issue. In January 1951 the Jewish physician Yakov Etinger died, after an interrogation, in the Lefortovo jail. At this penitentiary, "the marble stairs have been so worn down by the myriads of doomed prisoners ... that today these stairs can be climbed only by placing one's feet on the outermost margins of

each step.” (Lefortovo’s torture chamber had special soundproofing to muffle prisoners’ shrieks.) M.D. Ryumin, Etinger’s interrogator, charged State Security Minister Viktor Abakumov—responsible for the NKVD secret police, or, as it now called itself, the MGB—with concealing Etinger’s admission of having eliminated Central Committee member A.S. Shcherbakov in 1945. Actually, Etinger had made no such admission, and historians agree that Shcherbakov so far defied the law of Politburo averages as to have died of natural causes. But by this time Stalin had the concept of medical malpractice on the brain. Inflicting permanent panic upon “decadent” scribblers and “formalist” tunesmiths was all very well, but how many divisions did *they* have? Better for the *Vozhd* (“Great Leader”) to pursue doctors—whose real or alleged roles in killing Maxim Gorky and other such delicate flowers of Soviet culture could always be turned against them—and, simultaneously, purge the security police.

Thus the heroic machine of Soviet mendacity cranked into renewed motion. Khrushchev commented in his memoirs, “Stalin ... used to say that if a report was ten percent true, we should regard the entire report as fact.” Ryumin voiced similar postmodernist sentiments: “We ourselves will decide what is truth and what is a lie.”

Before Zhdanov had perished, Dr. Lidia Timashuk, an MGB operative at the hospital “treating” him, had protested in writing against the inadequate care the sick man received. When the extermination of potential Leningrad rivals had emboldened Uncle Joe anew, Dr. Timashuk’s complaints magically reappeared from the archives. Abakumov, from his cell, spouted the same sort of masochistic verbiage that Grigori Zinoviev and his fellow Old Bolsheviks had once oozed forth: “Whatever assignment You may give me ... I have no other life than to struggle for the work of Comrade Stalin.” Alas, such verbiage stopped well short of formally confessing his guilt in approved 1930s style. Sophia Karpai, one of the physicians accused of slaying Zhdanov, demonstrated equal recalci-

trance about specifics. So did Solomon Mikhoels’s leading Jewish Antifascist Committee colleagues, though they ended up being shot anyway. Even some Soviet judges dug their heels in—as they conspicuously had not done in 1935-38—at the concept of automatically committing judicial murder without hard evi-

BERIA ENSURED REGIME CHANGE BY QUIETLY SLIPPING SOME BLOOD-THINNER INTO MR. NICE GUY’S DIET BEFORE HE COULD UNLEASH WORLD WAR III.

dence. Besides, in 1951-53, Hitler’s military threat no longer existed to sharpen Stalin’s domestic resourcefulness. Little wonder, then, that in December 1952 Stalin raged at the Central Committee, “Here, look at you, blind men, kittens.” (During his last years he ransacked the animal kingdom for freakish metaphors: he described slothful security policemen—still widely called “Chekists,” though the name “Cheka” had officially been abandoned in 1922—as “hippopotamuses.” Perhaps the words “kittens” and “hippopotamuses” sound more menacing in Russian; or perhaps Stalin’s vituperation, as Thurber might have put it, lost something in the original language.)

In January 1953, the Soviet news media formally proclaimed the “Doctors’ Plot” to an astonished world. Informer Timashuk received the Order of Lenin, attracted delirious public applause, and inspired incautious comparisons with Joan of Arc. Then ... nothing. When Stalin died the following March, the doctors remained alive: incarcerated and horribly thrashed, true, but alive. Brent and Naumov postulate the hypothesis that Lavrenti Beria ensured regime change by quietly slipping some crystals of the blood-thinner Warfarin into Mr. Nice Guy’s diet before the latter could unleash World War III. Once Beria had taken over, he not only ordered the doctors’ release and had Timashuk stripped of her official honors but may actually have boasted to Molotov: “I did him [Stalin] in! I saved all of you!” He failed, nevertheless, to save himself. The charges brought against him included complicity in that same Doc-

tors’ Plot frame-up that he bragged of aborting. (Brent and Naumov follow the received wisdom of accepting Dec. 23, 1953 as the date of Beria’s execution. The present reviewer, like Beria’s biographer Amy Knight, retains his doubts as to whether anyone with Beria’s attested cunning would really have been allowed

to survive for months after his downfall.) Abakumov and Ryumin were both shot in 1954; Timashuk lived till 1983, vainly seeking rehabilitation.

Is Stalinism’s habitat a vanished past? We should be so lucky. While the smallest suggestion of doing Hitler’s state some service routinely blackens careers (ask Kurt Waldheim), the erstwhile KGB gangsterism of President Putin and former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov has gone entirely unpunished. Moreover, last March the *New York Times* reported, “The latest poll of 1,600 adults by the All-Russian Public Opinion Center ... shows that more than half of all respondents believe Stalin’s role in Russian history was positive, while only a third disagreed.” What this statistic indicates about the average contemporary Russian’s capacity to civilize himself—let alone to become a good little law-abiding Fukuyama devotee by next week—is not readily answered. Nor is the question of whether we can ever expect a significantly different outcome from Moscow’s rulers, especially given the West’s refusal in 1992 to obey Solzhenitsyn’s demand for a Nuremberg-style international criminal trial of the Warsaw Pact’s chief thugs. That raising these issues nowadays appears paradoxical, if not vaguely treasonous, surely indicates how greatly millenarian pipe-dreams of universal democratization have softened (even since 1991) Western leaders’ brains. ■

R.J. Stove lives in Melbourne, Australia, and is the author of The Unsleeping Eye: Secret Police and Their Victims.

[*The American Revolution: A History*, Gordon S. Wood, Modern Library, 166 pages]

Misreading the Revolution

By H.A. Scott Trask IV

GORDON WOOD, the author of the Bancroft-prize-winning *Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787* (1970) and the Pulitzer-prize-winning *Radicalism of the American Revolution* (1993), has written a short history of the American Revolution that is refreshingly free of politically correct obsessions with race and gender. Nevertheless, it is marred by presentism, progressivism, and statism.

Wood claims the revolution "produced all of the great hopes and values of the American people." Yet the hopes of the Anglo-Americans (for a loving companion, a healthy family, a prosperous farm, a successful business, and a comfortable home) long predated the revolution, and their values were those of their British and Northern European forbears, modified by the frontier, and infused with Protestant Christianity. He claims the "noblest ideals and aspirations of Americans—... freedom, constitutionalism, the well-being of ordinary people, and equality, especially equality, came out of the Revolutionary era." Americans did not have "ideals and aspirations" in the sense in which Wood implies, and it was their love of freedom and constitutionalism that caused them to revolt in the first place. His phrase "well-being of ordinary people" seems to suggest some kind of tradition whose natural progression ends in the welfare state. Americans of that day despised dependency, servility, and taxation, all of which follow when government usurps the duties of the family, the church, and the community. Liberty was more important to them than equality.

Wood also claims that the revolution invested Americans with a special mis-

sion or "national purpose" of world liberation. It "convinced Americans that they were a special people with a special destiny to lead the world toward liberty." They "saw themselves striving not only to make themselves free, but also to bring freedom to the whole world." Wood's language is highly dangerous because it conveys the erroneous impression that Bush's crusade to democratize the Middle East represents the fulfillment of the promise of the American Revolution. Americans had thought of themselves as a special people long before 1775. New Englanders had been thinking in those terms since 1630. They considered themselves the freest people in Christendom, and they fought the English not "to make themselves free" but to secure a freedom they had long enjoyed and now believed would only be safe independent of the British Empire. For long afterwards, Americans thought more in terms of separating themselves from the corruption and despotism of the Old World than of transforming it. They hoped their constitutional republic would set an example of successful self-government under law, but they did not have the grandiose dreams and collective purpose described by Wood. Jefferson's oft-expressed wish that the Atlantic were an "ocean of fire" expressed perfectly the Americans' preferred political relationship with the rest of the world.

WOOD CLAIMS THAT THE REVOLUTION INVESTED AMERICANS WITH A SPECIAL MISSION OR "NATIONAL PURPOSE" OF WORLD LIBERATION.

Wood even suggests that the policy of open immigration was inaugurated by the revolution. He quotes Thomas Paine's call in *Common Sense* for Americans to "receive the fugitive, and prepare in time an asylum for mankind." Standing alone, this sentence makes it appear that Americans are obligated to accept massive immigration from everywhere, and that such a policy was intended from the beginning. Yet, Americans responded to Paine's pamphlet

because it boldly counseled and justified political independence, not because it celebrated open borders, and few readers would have interpreted that sentence literally. Besides, as a mere pamphleteer and Englishman, his words are hardly binding on subsequent generations.

Wood seems to have done little reading in political theory and to have learned nothing from two centuries of American political experience. He praises the new constitution for having solved the problem of "factions" and cites Madison for explaining how in *Federalist 10*. Madison contended that in a large republic factions would be so multiplied and disbursed that none could gain control of the government. Yet, as early as the 1820s, astute observers realized that "extending the sphere" was no cure for factional politics, for various special interests had combined in logrolling coalitions to achieve their political aims. Wood seems unaware that the modern special-interest group is the equivalent of the 18th-century faction and that minority rule has largely supplanted majority rule.

He also asserts that the founders' "frank and unabashed commitment to elitism ... profoundly separates them from us." Their elitism was anything but frank and unabashed. The delegates to the 1787 convention met behind closed doors, and their disparaging remarks about democracy were certainly not

meant for the multitudes of Boston or Philadelphia. Modern elites are even more contemptuous of democracy and the popular will than their 18th-century predecessors and have no qualms about ignoring it or reversing it with a federal judicial decision. The contempt and disdain of our academic, media, and governing elites for those they regard as the ignorant, rude, and somewhat dangerous residents of "flyover country" is well known, and if Wood does not know

that the United States has a *de facto* governing class, he is a man who has spent too much time in the Ivory Tower.

With regard to the origin, nature, and powers of the federal government, Wood makes serious interpretive errors. First, he repeats the long-standing nationalist canard that it was the American people as an aggregate mass, "and not the states, that ordained and established the Constitution." The historical record is quite clear that the people of the states, as discrete and independent political societies, framed, debated, and ratified the Constitution. The preamble phrase "We the People" originally read "the people of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, etc.," but it was changed for reasons of style and because the framers did not know which states might not ratify the new constitution.

He claims that the framers created "an extraordinarily powerful national government, ... a single republican state that would ... encompass all the diverse and scattered interests of the whole of American society." The new government was neither powerful nor national; it was federal, and the Constitution left the diverse and scattered interests of American society to self- or state regulation. Article I, Section 8 carefully enumerated congressional powers, limiting them to defense, foreign affairs, coinage, and the regulation of commerce. They were few and defined, while those of the states were left numerous and undefined. The states were expressly forbidden to do certain things, but except in those areas expressly committed to federal authority, the states remained self-governing, independent republics. He ignores the 10th Amendment, which reiterated the crucial distinction between federal powers (delegated) and state powers (reserved) and which Jefferson considered "the cornerstone" of the Constitution.

Wood skates over the failure of the nationalists (centralizers) at the convention, such as Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, to draft a constitution for a powerful national government. The federalists outvoted them, and the proposed government remained federal in

character.

Even more damning to Wood's claim are the debates in the states over whether to ratify the new constitution. Opponents of the new constitution, called anti-Federalists although they were the true federalists, charged that the new government was powerful and national in character and would threaten the reserved powers of the states. The misnamed Federalists strenuously denied these charges. Thus, the best witnesses against Wood are the Federalists themselves! Furthermore, newspaper editors, political writers, and presidents commonly described the United States as a "confederation" or "a confederated republic" up to 1861.

Wood is highly unjust to the anti-Federalists, whom he describes as "narrow-minded middling men with interests to promote." He understands narrow-minded to be anyone who does not favor strong centralized government. Many anti-Federalist leaders, such as Rawlins Lowndes of South Carolina and Luther Martin of Maryland, were disinterested men of education and wealth who had principled objections to the new Constitution, and scores of Federalists were bondholders who stood to gain financially if the new government were instituted, as well as politically, by elevation to powerful federal offices. Moreover, many of the anti-Federalist objections to the new constitution have been vindicated by subsequent history. Wood even quotes one who warned the new government "must eventually annihilate the independent sovereignties of the several states," without seeming to realize that this was exactly what happened.

Wood also makes the preposterous assertion that the founders achieved a great breakthrough for freedom and the science of politics by lodging sovereignty (the final law-making authority in any political society) in "the people at large," so that the people became "the final supreme lawmaking authority." Yet in a republic the people do not make the laws; their representatives do. Only in a direct democracy, like that of ancient Athens, could the people be sovereign.

Having frequent elections does not change the matter. Unless representatives are the mere agents of the people, executing their independently determined will, and vigilantly watched by citizens who record and remember their votes, the government remains republican, and the citizens are not the rulers. Wood really seems to think that the founders created a government that was republican in form but democratic in practice and that it remains so today. The sad truth is that the American people have never met the exacting standards of intelligence and vigilant attention expected of them. The real question in 1788, and for the next 78 years, was whether sovereignty resided in the federal government or in the states, or was divided between them. This all-important question was not finally decided until 1865, when a Northern victory established undivided national sovereignty in Washington.

Few educated Americans seem aware that the French nobleman and political theorist Montesquieu exerted at least as much influence on the founders' politi-

MOVING?

Changing your address?

Simply go to **The American Conservative** website, www.amconmag.com.

Click "subscribe" and then click "address change." To access your account make sure you have your TAC mailing label. You may also subscribe or renew online.

If you prefer to mail your address change send your TAC label with your new address to:

The American Conservative
Subscription Department
P.O. Box 99010
Collingswood, NJ 08108-0612

cal ideas as the Englishman John Locke. In his *Spirit of the Laws* (1748), Montesquieu taught that republics required homogeneity in their citizen body and modesty in their territorial extent.

While acknowledging Montesquieu's influence upon the revolutionaries and the anti-Federalists, Wood makes the mistake of assuming that with the establishment of the new federal government, Montesquieu's ideas ceased to be relevant or influential, for the new republic was both large and diverse. Not so fast. While the federal union was diverse in climate, resources, interests, and regional cultures, the states were not, and it was in the states, as distinct political societies, where most governing would take place.

Americans continued to believe that their confederated republic could expand across North America without losing its republican character because it was decentralized and the states retained the right to determine eligibility for citizenship and voting within their borders (Article I, Section 2). Thus, the founders did not discard Montesquieu. The question for their descendants is, after having lost their republic to a multicultural empire, do we need to bring him back? ■

H.A. Scott Trask IV has a Ph.D. in American history, has just finished a political biography of 19th-century political economist Condé Raguet, and has started a study of the Northern peace movement during the Civil War.

[*Images of Terror: What We Can and Can't Know About Terrorism*, Philip Jenkins, Aldine de Gruyter, 227 pages]

Taking Terror Apart

By Jeremy Lott

COMEDIAN DAVE BARRY is a funny guy but sometimes he isn't very bright. In the introduction to his book on the foibles of the federal government, he held up the alternative-reality Democrats-are-still-in-the-White-House television drama "The West Wing" as a good example of what is wrong with the culture of Washington, D.C. The characters on the show act as if every little thing they do has enormous repercussions, as is often the case in real life. He singled out one episode in which the regular cast "hotly debat[ed] the question of whether the president should chide some environmental group for not condemning ecoterrorism. In other words, the issue was totally about words—whether the president should say harsh words to a group because that group had failed to say harsh words to another group. Nobody was talking about *doing* anything."

Penn State professor Philip Jenkins has probably not read *Dave Barry Hits Below the Beltway*, but if he has he would have winced at the suggestion that White-House debates about how to deal with any kind of terrorism didn't have real-world repercussions. All that jaw-jawing sets things in motion. "If a movement associated with a particular cause is commonly agreed to be terrorist," Jenkins explains in his new book *Images of Terror*, "then ... that stigma adheres not only to the armed group itself, but also to other peaceful groups that might share its views, whether or not they have any connection with violence."

At the law-enforcement level, the terrorist label leads to greater surveillance of both the offending group and its

peaceful fellow travelers, which in turn leads to deportations and other restrictions and inconveniences. Little wonder then, says Jenkins, that political movements work so hard to resist the application of the T-word to their violent but well-meaning fellow ideologues. In fact, one might wonder what "The West Wing's" President Bartlett, a liberal Democrat, was doing sabotaging his own base. Maybe it was one of those post-election Sistah Souljah moments for which Democrats are so famous.

Unlike most of the recent books on terrorism, *Images of Terror: What We Can and Can't Know About Terrorism* doesn't attempt to add new information on a specific terrorist threat or movement. Instead it looks at how terrorism is portrayed by government and in the media and how the views of the state play a very large role in how we conceive of everything from the post-Sept. 11 anthrax attacks to assassinations to home-grown groups that might be prone to violence. Jenkins starts with the jarring approach that terrorism, "like any other problem, is socially constructed," which he immediately qualifies by assuring that this isn't an endorsement of a relativist view of terrorism (e.g., "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter"—a view that chapter two demolishes).

In opposition to what we might call the "shattered innocence" view of terrorism in the U.S.—that terrorism before Sept. 11 was something that happened *out there*—Jenkins argues that it is a well-established part of American life. Though recent technological advances have made killing on a larger scale easier, terror attacks on U.S. soldiers, embassies, citizens, visitors, businesses, and government offices were neither unheard of nor all that rare in the previous century. Both foreign and home-grown terror groups have been here before, particularly in the 1970s, and figured prominently in that era's headlines. Last year, there was a minor to-do when former members of the leftist Symbionese Liberation Army had the book thrown at them for their violent

**Subscribe to
The American
Conservative
Today.**

Simply go to
www.amconmag.com
and click "Subscribe"

or call

1-800-579-6148

actions in the 1970s. It was, however, quite a small story. "[T]errorist campaigns of bygone years have largely faded from memory: terrorism is a menace that is discovered anew each generation, if not each new decade," writes Jenkins.

It is rarely a welcome discovery. On the domestic front, politicians find terrorism to be highly inconvenient to their own policy goals and constituencies. Throughout the Reagan and first Bush administrations, anti-abortion violence was downplayed; it was not until Clinton took office that it was taken seriously as a terrorist threat (which encouraged groups like NOW to use RICO racketeering laws to go after peaceful pro-life groups). Cuban-American terrorism has been given a pass by both Republican and Democratic administrations, who need the anti-Castro vote in Florida (along with a few hanging chads) to win that state. Many people cynically, and I believe rightly, upbraided Bill Clinton for pardoning Puerto Rican terrorists while his wife was in a tight race for a Senate seat in New York, a state with an unusually high Puerto Rican population.

Terrorism that originates from foreign sources can be, if anything, even pricklier. While a popular view of terrorism has the bad guys phoning in to claim credit, this is not always the case—fictitious terrorist organizations are often invented to send investigators down rabbit trails. Assassinations and bombings are carried out by gunmen and explosives experts who were hired by anonymous third parties in order to avoid retaliation or to create conditions under which just retaliation can be used to the terrorists' advantage.

Because of the consequences of linking country A to terrorist action B (e.g., war, economic sanctions, the possibility of upsetting important political-coalition apple carts), intelligence agencies are under immense pressure to proceed selectively. The lone nut bomber or gunman has become a favorite stock profile, even though it has proven disastrously wrong in several recent key

cases, including the Richard Jewell Olympic bombing false accusations and, probably, the FBI's current hounding of anthrax-suspect Steven Hatfill.


Terrorism is an explicitly political act, aimed at fomenting change, but not always the kinds of change we might expect. What normal people would consider a defeat is only the opening gambit for committed terrorists. Often, the goal of blowing things up is to provoke a strong reaction by the terror victims, which will tilt the sympathy of the local population in favor of the terrorists. Though Jenkins supported the recent wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq, he warns that local militants might be able to goad the occupying troops into cracking down too hard and thereby win recruits for future suicide missions and other acts of destruction.

Counterterrorism, likewise, operates in its own parallel universe, one in which most people would be uncomfortable. From the counterterrorist's point of view, the old rules of law enforcement make little sense. The idea is to prevent terrorism beforehand not to punish it afterwards. This is best accomplished through extensive sur-

veillance of potential subversives and infiltration of various terrorist cells. Ideally, the intelligence agencies will "turn" important people within terrorist organizations and use that influence to limit terror acts—though if they ever succeed in eliminating a terror organization outright, it might create a market niche that new terror groups could fill.

Of course, Jenkins allows that this approach is not without its problems: "The whole idea of *potential* subversives or terrorists is controversial—some would say, repellant and Orwellian. ... This notion contradicts basic democratic beliefs about the role of police, and the investigation of crime. It evokes the science fiction fantasy of detecting crimes before they happen, as outlined in the film *Minority Report*, with its concept of 'precrime'—though in our case we are speaking of real police forces, real suspects, and the violation of real rights." And, he might have added, that's just for starters. ■

Jeremy Lott writes the weekly "Latte Sipping" column for the American Spectator Online. He lives in Washington State.



"When I have to fire someone, I use a helium voice to make it less traumatic."

COPYRIGHT BY RANDY GLASBERGEN. WWW.GLASBERGEN.COM

A Moveable Feast

Charlie Glass rang from Syria and announced that he was off to Pamplona to run the bulls *à la* Papa Hemingway. "Goldie [as in Hawn] is coming with Kurt Russell,

Nick Scott, and you can be the fifth, just like in *The Sun Also Rises*," said Charlie. "I'm not coming as Cohn," snapped I, "nor as Jake Barnes, so I guess I'll have to be Mike Campbell," or words to that effect. Glass is a very close friend and pulled my leg non-stop about being too old to run. "Well, unlike you, Glass, I ran them in 1956, and I'll run them again, so help me Pheidippides." Goldie and Kurt were the first to drop out, and I may be next, although I'm still going to Pamplona with the boys.

Cricket has done me in, but not for long. There we were, on a brilliant Saturday Devon afternoon, with lotsa young girls cheering us on, so I had to show off a bit, especially as I was bowled out on the second ball. Mind you, cricket sounds like a poofter's game, but it can be very, very painful. Think of standing 15 feet off home plate without a glove and the ball coming at you at over 100 mph. (A cricket ball is harder than a baseball.) I took a direct shot on my hip and for the moment I cannot run, only limp. The running of the bulls is on July 7. I write this with two weeks to go. If I can run, I'll run them, but no cripple has ever run the bulls in Pamplona and lived to brag about it.

But back to Papa and *The Sun Also Rises*. I read him early on and swore to myself that the moment I got out of school I'd head for Paris, Pamplona, and the Floridita bar in Havana. And I kept my promise. Like a devout 15th-century Catholic going from cathedral to cathe-

dral, I made my Hemingway pilgrimage my first summer of freedom. La Closerie des Lilas, 74 rue Cardinal Lemoine, Les Deux Magots, the Ritz bar, Pamplona ... You name it, I went to it.

For someone brought up on Greek myths, nothing encapsulated Papa's view of life better than *The Old Man and The Sea*. Like Odysseus, Santiago struggles on and refuses to give up in the face of death. Unlike the Ithacan king, however, Santiago is a rather pathetic figure. I loved *Death in the Afternoon* for the same reason. You did not have to be a connoisseur of bullfighting to appreciate the virtues Papa celebrates. The bullfighters risk all in their combat with nature, not for any material rewards—which are plenty—but so as to enact man's lonely struggle against forces far more powerful than he is. Man does not flee mortal peril but embraces it. The matador is not a tragic hero. He could be

I WAS 19 WHEN I RAN THE BULLS IN PAMPLONA IN 1956. I FLEW LIKE WIND AND MADE IT TO THE PLAZA DE TORROS. IT NEVER ENTERED MY MIND THAT I MIGHT BE GORED.

anyone. Hemingway did not espouse the fashionable idea—yes, even back then—that we are all heroes the moment we venture out of bed. Heroes were those who sought to enact in their own lives the tension between mortality and immortality. The heroes were those who went to war—not those who send oth-

ers to do the fighting—and those who were ready to fight for honor.

Every time I read Papa, it brought back memories of Greece and her mythological heroes. Greek heroes never complained. Neither did Papa's. But they did ask why. Recall Jake Barnes about his loss of manhood or Lieutenant Henry about his loss of Catherine. In an age where everyone is a victim, no wonder Hemingway is considered by some as too macho. But feminists, critics, and academics can go to hell. As Norman Mailer said, "Papa is the cavalry of American letters." He made narrative prose into a physical medium—tough, stoical, suffering, what is known as "grace under pressure." He was much imitated, and imitated himself towards the end when the going was very slow. But he was a wonderful-looking man of action, a tough guy, as different from today's writers—except for Mailer—as Ava Gardner (his favorite) is from Monica Lewinsky.

When Papa began his apprenticeship at the *Kansas City Star*, he was handed a style sheet with four basic rules: "Use

short sentences. Use short first paragraphs. Use vigorous English. Be positive, not negative." Here's Dartmouth English professor Jeffrey Hart on Hemingway: "He used simple sentences that required you to think. ... Every word of early Hemingway counted. And counted a hell of a lot." When Hemingway began

writing, he was confronted with what was chic at the time—the rejection of maturity, modernism in the arts, bright young things, and radicalism in politics. He chose instead to write about the beauties and terrors of nature, the masculine virtues, and the nobility of failure.

His style prevailed over the cynicism of the Twenties. He became the first pop idol—perhaps the second, after Lord Byron—and millions were influenced by the macho style. For someone like me, growing up in America, there were only Hemingwayesque heroes to look up to: Dylan Thomas, destroying his art by drinking and whoring until he dropped dead; Charlie Parker playing 52nd Street, his arms scarred with heroin tracks; Rocky Graziano smoking in the locker room before going out to knock out tough-as-leather Tony Zale; Ted Williams, the best hitter ever, volunteering for flying missions over North Korea. Here's a friend, Stanley Reynolds, writing on Papa: "Making a room for him in my bookshop by removing some of those revolutionary chaps who are always on about the common man, but give you the impression they have never actually met one." Stanley wrote this long ago, but he could have been writing about Salman Rushdie or Martin Amis or any of the effete writers of today.

Moreover—and this particularly appealed to me about Papa—heroism was something that belonged to men. Women had no interest in risking all in the play of mortality. They could not understand why someone would want to face death. The title of his collection, *Men Without Women*, did not refer to life in San Francisco bathhouses, but to the camaraderie and shared values that united men. Not that Papa was against


women. But he warned of the dangers of men accepting women's view of the world as their own. This is what Harry realizes as he lies dying in *The Snows of Kilimanjaro*.

For myself, I like to quote from the first story Hemingway ever published, on April 12, 1918, when he was 18 years old. Compare its youthful take on a dance and a prostitute to today's crap writing about the horrors of ennui and bad cocaine:

Outside, a woman walked along the wet lamp-lit sidewalk through the sleet and snow. Inside, on the sixth floor of the YWCA building, a merry crowd of soldiers from Camp Funston fox-trotted and one-stepped with girls from the Fine Arts School while a sober-faced young man pounded out the latest jazz music as he watched the moving figures. In a corner a private was discussing Whistler with a black-haired girl who had been a member of the art colony at Chicago. ... Outside, the woman walked along the wet lamp-lit sidewalk.


Not bad for an 18-year-old, *n'est pas*?

I was 19 when I ran the bulls in Pamplona in 1956. I wore a white shirt, white trousers, and a red handkerchief around my neck. I had drunk non-stop through the night and joined the runners in the morning. I flew like wind and made it to the Plaza de Torros. It never entered my mind that I might be gored. Forty-seven years later, I find myself having lost a step or two, perhaps 10 or 20, or even much more. Charlie Glass can't run to save his life, but he can drink and is brave. Nick Scott is an adventurous Englishman. We will do fine. ■



REVEALED...The biggest UNTOLD scandal of the Clinton presidency!

From the officer entrusted with our nation's nuclear codes: proof that Bill Clinton cared little for national security and put every American in mortal danger



When he was tapped to accompany President Clinton and carry the nuclear "football" that contains the top-secret codes the President needs in case of nuclear war, Colonel Robert "Buzz" Patterson was proud and grateful. But when he entered the Clinton White House, his gratitude and awe soon gave way to shock, revulsion, and sorrow — as he saw first-hand the cavalier and self-serving way Slick Willie and his henchmen went about the business of running the country.

Essential reading for every patriot who wants to do his part to prevent such a debased character from ever occupying the Oval Office again.

In **Dereliction of Duty: The Eyewitness Account of How Bill Clinton Compromised America's National Security**, Patterson tells the whole story. Day in and day out in the Clinton White House, he witnessed the President's contempt for the military, his indifference to important issues except insofar as they served his own political or personal purposes, and his reduction of the Office of the Presidency to a playground for his own ambition and thirst for sordid perks!

☒ **YES!** Please enroll me as a member of the Conservative Book Club under the terms outlined in this ad. Send *Dereliction of Duty* for FREE and bill me just for the shipping and handling. I then need to buy only two additional books over the next year at regularly discounted Club prices (20-50% off retail).

C1137-AZ

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

Email _____

Fill out this coupon and mail to:

• Prices slightly higher in Canada • Membership subject to approval by the Conservative Book Club

CONSERVATIVE BOOK CLUB

P.O. Box 97196, Washington, DC 20090-7196

1147

6153

